股票期权授予和成本行为

Q4 Business, Management and Accounting

Journal of Applied Business Research Pub Date : 2018-02-15 DOI:10.19030/JABR.V34I2.10125

Dae-Hyun Kwon

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引用次数: 5

摘要

本研究探讨成本不对称与股票期权授予的关系。假设管理者降低后续期权奖励执行价格的激励可能会影响管理者的资源调整决策。使用美国公司的数据，我发现SG&A(销售、一般和行政)成本不对称的程度与授予ceo的后续期权授予的价值正相关，这表明期望获得大量股票期权的经理故意推迟承诺成本的减少，以降低期权授予日期之前的股价。操纵股票期权授予时间并不能完全解释这一结果，因为本文所证明的正相关关系仍然只在固定日期的期权授予样本中成立。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Stock Option Grants And Cost Behavior

This study examines the relation between cost asymmetry and stock option grants. I posit that managers’ incentives to decrease the strike price of subsequent option awards may affect manager’s resource adjustment decisions. Using U.S. firm data, I find that the degree of SG&A (selling, general, and administrative) cost asymmetry is positively related to the value of subsequent option grants awarded to the CEOs, suggesting that managers who expect large stock-option grants deliberately delay reduction of committed costs to decrease the share price prior to the option award date. Manipulating the timing of stock option grants do not fully explain the results because the positive relation that this paper documents still holds with only fixed-date option awards sample.

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来源期刊

Journal of Applied Business Research Business, Management and Accounting-Business and International Management

CiteScore

0.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) welcomes articles in all areas of applied business and economics research. Both theoretical and applied manuscripts will be considered for publication; however, theoretical manuscripts must provide a clear link to important and interesting business and economics applications. Using a wide range of research methods including statistical analysis, analytical work, case studies, field research, and historical analysis, articles examine significant applied business and economics research questions from a broad range of perspectives. The intention of JABR is to publish papers that significantly contribute to these fields.