最后手段担保人

IF 2.2 2区 社会学 Q1 LAW
Kathryn Judge
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引用次数: 2

摘要

对金融危机的最佳反应需要解决两个经常相互冲突的要求:停止恐慌和启动时钟。当短期储户逃离时,银行可能被迫以贱卖价格出售资产,导致信贷收缩,实体经济活动下降。为了减少这些不利的溢出效应,政策制定者通常会进行干预,以阻止系统性挤兑。然而,政策制定者往往会采取权宜之计,让根本问题恶化。为了促进长期经济健康,他们还必须找出根本问题,并分配无法避免的损失。一个精心设计的最后担保人可以帮助解决这些相互矛盾的需求。及时保障将私人资本保留在系统中,为决策者提供了制定可行计划以解决不足所需的时间。对这些保证的严格时间限制确保了政策制定者和市场参与者仍然有动力制定这样的计划,避免了过度宽容的另一个陷阱。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Guarantor of Last Resort
The optimal response to a financial crisis entails addressing two, often conflicting, demands: stopping the panic and starting the clock. When short-term depositors flee, banks can be forced to sell assets at fire-sale prices, causing credit to contract and real economic activity to decline. To reduce these adverse spillover effects, policymakers routinely intervene to stop systemic runs. All too often, however, policymakers deploy stopgap measures that allow the underlying problems to fester. To promote long-term economic health, they must also ferret out the underlying problems and allocate the losses that cannot be avoided. A well-designed guarantor of last resort can help address these conflicting demands. Just-in-time guarantees keep private capital in the system, providing policymakers the time that they need to develop a viable plan to address deficiencies. A strict time limit on those guarantees ensures that policymakers and market participants remain motivated to devise such a plan, avoiding the alternative pitfall of excessive forbearance.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.40
自引率
6.20%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Texas Law Review is a national and international leader in legal scholarship. Texas Law Review is an independent journal, edited and published entirely by students at the University of Texas School of Law. Our seven issues per year contain articles by professors, judges, and practitioners; reviews of important recent books from recognized experts, essays, commentaries; and student written notes. Texas Law Review is currently the ninth most cited legal periodical in federal and state cases in the United States and the thirteenth most cited by legal journals.
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