策略的可证明性、无关备选方案的独立性和多数规则

IF 8.1 1区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
P. Dasgupta, E. Maskin
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引用次数: 8

摘要

我们证明了策略证明性、帕累托原则、匿名性、中立性、无关选择的独立性和决定性在任何存在满足这些公理的投票规则的偏好领域中都是多数决的唯一特征。在我们的表述中,战略验证性包括联盟的操纵。然而,我们证明,当联盟被限制为任意小的规模时,该表征仍然成立。我们还证明了当联盟可以在定义域外操作时,在任何没有孔多塞循环的定义域上都存在满足这些公理的多数决规则的扩展。(凝胶D72)
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Strategy-Proofness, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Majority Rule
We show that strategy-proofness, the Pareto principle, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and decisiveness uniquely characterize majority rule on any domain of preferences for which there exists a voting rule satisfying these axioms. In our formulation, strategy-proofness includes manipulations by coalitions. However, we demonstrate that the characterization still holds when coalitions are restricted to arbitrarily small size. We also show that when coalitions can manipulate outside the domain, there is an extension of majority rule that satisfies these axioms on any domain without Condorcet cycles. (JEL D72)
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来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
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期刊介绍: The journal American Economic Review: Insights (AER: Insights) is a publication that caters to a wide audience interested in economics. It shares the same standards of quality and significance as the American Economic Review (AER) but focuses specifically on papers that offer important insights communicated concisely. AER: Insights releases four issues annually, covering a diverse range of topics in economics.
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