{"title":"策略的可证明性、无关备选方案的独立性和多数规则","authors":"P. Dasgupta, E. Maskin","doi":"10.1257/aeri.20200178","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We show that strategy-proofness, the Pareto principle, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and decisiveness uniquely characterize majority rule on any domain of preferences for which there exists a voting rule satisfying these axioms. In our formulation, strategy-proofness includes manipulations by coalitions. However, we demonstrate that the characterization still holds when coalitions are restricted to arbitrarily small size. We also show that when coalitions can manipulate outside the domain, there is an extension of majority rule that satisfies these axioms on any domain without Condorcet cycles. (JEL D72)","PeriodicalId":29954,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Review-Insights","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":8.1000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"8","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Strategy-Proofness, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Majority Rule\",\"authors\":\"P. Dasgupta, E. Maskin\",\"doi\":\"10.1257/aeri.20200178\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We show that strategy-proofness, the Pareto principle, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and decisiveness uniquely characterize majority rule on any domain of preferences for which there exists a voting rule satisfying these axioms. In our formulation, strategy-proofness includes manipulations by coalitions. However, we demonstrate that the characterization still holds when coalitions are restricted to arbitrarily small size. We also show that when coalitions can manipulate outside the domain, there is an extension of majority rule that satisfies these axioms on any domain without Condorcet cycles. (JEL D72)\",\"PeriodicalId\":29954,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"American Economic Review-Insights\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":8.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"8\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"American Economic Review-Insights\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20200178\",\"RegionNum\":1,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Economic Review-Insights","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20200178","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
Strategy-Proofness, Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Majority Rule
We show that strategy-proofness, the Pareto principle, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and decisiveness uniquely characterize majority rule on any domain of preferences for which there exists a voting rule satisfying these axioms. In our formulation, strategy-proofness includes manipulations by coalitions. However, we demonstrate that the characterization still holds when coalitions are restricted to arbitrarily small size. We also show that when coalitions can manipulate outside the domain, there is an extension of majority rule that satisfies these axioms on any domain without Condorcet cycles. (JEL D72)
期刊介绍:
The journal American Economic Review: Insights (AER: Insights) is a publication that caters to a wide audience interested in economics. It shares the same standards of quality and significance as the American Economic Review (AER) but focuses specifically on papers that offer important insights communicated concisely. AER: Insights releases four issues annually, covering a diverse range of topics in economics.