知名审计委员会主席的愿望:财务报告质量的好处是什么?

IF 2.8 3区 管理学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Géraldine Broye, Pauline Johannes
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引用次数: 3

摘要

目的本研究旨在探讨审计委员会主席的声望如何影响盈余管理。样本包含2007-2018年期间对1973家法国上市公司的年度观察结果。作者通过关注法国的商业精英体系,考察了AC主席和首席执行官的地位。本研究使用应计盈余管理和实际盈余管理(REM)的度量来测试AC主席(相对)地位与盈余管理水平之间的关联。研究结果本研究的结果并不表明高地位的交流主席约束应计操作。然而,研究结果提供了证据,证明他们在限制REM中发挥了关键作用。地位高的交流主席更有可能加强对这种操纵的监控,因为他们对公司的商业环境和实践有全面的了解和理解。该研究还发现,地位高于ceo的AC椅与较低水平的快速眼动有关。结果表明,声望较高的AC椅影响地位较低的ceo的战略决策。原创性/价值本研究表明,高地位的交流椅子在发现和约束偏离正常商业惯例方面发挥着重要作用。研究结果对董事会具有重大意义,了解高层主席的任命如何影响财务报告质量将使董事会受益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The desire of prestigious audit committee chairs: what are the benefits for financial reporting quality?
Purpose This study aims to examine how the prestige of audit committee (AC) chairpersons influences earnings management. Design/methodology/approach The sample contains 1,973 firm-year observations of French listed firms for the period 2007–2018. The authors examine the status of AC chairs and CEOs by focusing on the French business elite system. This study tests the association between AC chairs’ (relative) status and the level of earnings management using measures of accrual earnings management and real earnings management (REM). Findings The results of this study do not show that high-status AC chairs constrain accruals manipulation. However, the results provide evidence that they play a key role in constraining REM. High-status AC chairs are more likely to enhance the monitoring of this type of manipulation, given their thorough knowledge and understanding of the firm’s business environment and practices. This study also finds evidence that AC chairs with a status higher than CEOs are associated with lower levels of REM. The results suggest that prestigious AC chairs influence lower status CEOs’ strategic decisions. Originality/value This study demonstrates that high-status AC chairs play an important role in detecting and constraining deviations from normal business practices. The results have substantial implications for boards, which will benefit from an understanding of how the appointment of high-status chairs affects financial reporting quality.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.40
自引率
13.80%
发文量
45
期刊介绍: The key areas addressed are: ■Audit and Assurance (financial and non-financial) ■Financial and Managerial Reporting ■Governance, controls, risks and ethics ■Organizational issues including firm cultures, performance and development In addition, the evaluation of changes occurring in the auditing profession, as well as the broader fields of accounting and assurance, are also explored. Debates concerning organizational performance and professional competence are also covered.
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