论法律规范性的本质

Q2 Arts and Humanities

Revus Pub Date : 2019-05-24 DOI:10.4000/REVUS.5152

B. Bix

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在对我的文章“Kelsen, Hart, and legal normativity”的八篇评论的回应中，我澄清了我最初分析中的一些观点，并同意一些关于仍然需要做的工作的评论。特别是，我试图将我的立场与贝克莱的唯心主义和单纯的主观知觉区分开来。我同意评论员的观点，他们认为必须做更多的工作来分析规范性的本质，特别是法律规范性。

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On the nature of legal normativity

In this response to eight commentaries on my article “Kelsen, Hart, and legal normativity” I clarify some points in my original analysis and agree with some comments regarding work that still needs to be done. In particular, I attempt to distinguish my position from both Berkeleyan idealism and mere subjective perception. I agree with the commentators who urge that more must be done to analyze the nature of normativity in general, and legal normativity in particular.

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来源期刊

Revus Arts and Humanities-Philosophy

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

0.00%

发文量