Proportionality, Abstract Causation, and the Exclusion Problem

ABSTRACT A considerable number of philosophers are attracted to what might be called ‘causal type-abstractionism’ – the view that photographs, symphonies, models of cars, novels, flags, and other multiply instantiable entities that are, or at least seem to be, artifacts are a particular kind of abstracta, namely causally efficacious types. Despite its popularity, however, causal type-abstractionism faces a problem: Given some plausible assumptions, it commits us to a seemingly unpalatable consequence – that there is widespread type-causal overdetermination, or, in other words, a multitude of situations where one and the same effect has two or more distinct independently sufficient causes, at least one of which involves type causation. Recently, a powerful solution to this problem has been offered by Tim Juvshik. Drawing upon the literature on mental causation, he argues that the foregoing consequence could be avoided without abandoning causal type-abstractionism – if we adopt a particular treatment of causes based on Stephen Yablo’s principle of proportionality. My primary goal in this essay is to show that the given solution fails. Additionally, I aim to sketch a solution that, I think, provides a promising type-abstractionist way to resolve the problem being discussed.