知道精确报价作为一种谈判策略并不能减少其对还价的影响

IF 2.3 Q2 PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL
Todd J. Thorsteinson
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引用次数: 1

摘要

过去的研究表明,精确的首次报价(如4,983美元)在谈判中起到锚定作用,相对于整数的首次报价(如5,000美元),还盘会减少。精确的报价通常被认为表明出价的人更有能力和知识。研究人员进行了三项研究,以确定将精确报价作为谈判策略的知识是否会降低精确报价对还价的影响。在所有三项研究中,精确的报价比整数的报价引发的还价更小,即使参与者意识到精确是一种谈判策略,这种效应仍然存在。尽管它在减少还价方面很有效,但在三项研究中的两项中,与接受整数报价的参与者相比,接受精确报价的参与者更有可能决定谈判。对另一方的感知和规模粒度作为锚定类型(精确或整数报价)和还价之间关系的中介进行了检查。在所有三项研究中,感知到的公平都是一个中介。这些结果表明,精确的首次报价可以有效地减少还价,即使对方怀疑这是一种谈判策略。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Knowledge of precise offers as a negotiating tactic does not reduce its effect on counteroffers

Past research has demonstrated that precise first offers (e.g., $4,983) serve as an anchor in negotiations and reduce counteroffers relative to round first offers (e.g., $5,000). Precise offers are frequently perceived as indicating greater competence and knowledge of the person making the offer. Three studies were conducted to determine if knowledge of precise offers as a negotiating tactic would reduce the effect of precision on counteroffers. Precise offers elicited smaller counteroffers than round offers in all three studies, and this effect persisted even when participants were aware of precision as a negotiating tactic. Despite its effectiveness at reducing counteroffers, participants receiving precise offers were more likely to decide to negotiate compared to participants receiving a round offer in two of the three studies. Perceptions of the other party and scale granularity were examined as mediators of the relationship between anchor type (precise or round offer) and counteroffers. Perceived fairness of the offer emerged as a mediator in all three studies. These results suggest that a precise first offer can be effective at reducing counteroffers, even when the other party suspects that it is a negotiating tactic.

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来源期刊
Journal of Theoretical Social Psychology
Journal of Theoretical Social Psychology Psychology-Social Psychology
CiteScore
3.50
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0.00%
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4
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