具有三度价格歧视的垂直结构的进入社会效率

IF 0.3 4区 经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS
J. Chen, A. Mukherjee, Chenhang Zeng
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引用次数: 2

摘要

摘要我们研究了在存在下游成本不对称和上游价格歧视的情况下进入的社会效率。我们发现,当进入者效率很低时,进入是过度的,而当进入者有效率或低效率时,进入就不够了。这一结果与考虑上游统一定价的现有文献形成了鲜明对比(Cao,H.,and L.F.S.Wang。2020。“重新审视垂直相关行业的进入社会效率”,《经济学快报》第129期。第109200条),因为歧视性定价改变了商业盗窃、商业创造和生产效率效应的相对优势。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Social Efficiency of Entry in a Vertical Structure with Third Degree Price Discrimination
Abstract We study social efficiency of entry in the presence of downstream cost asymmetry and upstream price discrimination. We show that entry is excessive when the entrants are highly inefficient, and it is insufficient when either the entrants are efficient or their inefficiency is low. The results are in sharp contrast to the existing literature considering upstream uniform pricing (Cao, H., and L. F. S. Wang. 2020. “Social Efficiency of Entry in a Vertically Related Industry Revisited.” Economics Letters 129. Art. no. 109200), as discriminatory pricing alters the relative strengths of the business-stealing, business-creation and production-(in)efficiency effects.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
25.00%
发文量
25
期刊介绍: We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.
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