制度经济学与基础设施项目的资本成本

IF 3.3 3区 经济学 Q1 DEVELOPMENT STUDIES
R. Geddes, Josh Goldman
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引用次数: 2

摘要

摘要:在基础设施交付中,公私伙伴关系(PPP)的使用日益增多,重新引发了公共与私人资本成本的争论。早期的辩论得出结论,公共部门资本的社会成本低于私人资本,因为风险可能分散在众多纳税人身上。干预性研究的重点是由于股权持有人和管理人之间的分离加剧而产生的代理成本,以及控制这些代理成本的各种机制。我们分析了公共和私人剩余索赔及其相关代理成本的差异。我们的结论是,应该重新审视早先省略机构成本分析的讨论。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Institutional Economics and the Cost of Capital for Infrastructure Projects
ABSTRACT The growing use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) in infrastructure delivery has rekindled the public versus private cost-of-capital debate. Early debate concluded that the social cost of public-sector capital is below that of private capital because risk can be spread across numerous taxpayers. Intervening research focused on the agency costs that arise due to increased separation between equity holders and managers and the various mechanisms to control those agency costs. We analyze differences in public versus private residual claims and their associated agency costs. We conclude that earlier discussions that omitted agency-cost analysis should be revisited.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
6.60
自引率
0.00%
发文量
14
期刊介绍: The Journal of Economic Policy Reform focuses on the analysis of economic policy reform. The journal draws upon what lessons can be learned from the successes and failures of countries undertaking reforms and how existing theories can be developed to shed light on positive as well as normative aspects of the reform process. The Journal of Economic Policy Reform encourages work from economists and political economy analysts on policies to promote growth and reduce poverty, intellectual property rights, aid versus trade, debt and debt relief, taxation and social security systems, surveys of key reform issues, as well as on corruption, democracy, emerging markets and the role of multilateral institutions.
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