{"title":"监管者作为少数股东与公司欺诈:来自中国证券投资者服务中心试点项目的准自然实验证据","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.bar.2023.101242","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>The China Securities Investor Services Centre (CSISC) is a unique governance mechanism in China, backed by the Chinese regulator. This institution holds 100 shares of each public firm in the pilot<span> regions and monitors large shareholders by exercising its rights. Using a difference-in-difference (DID) methodology, the study investigates a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2013 to 2017 to evaluate the role of regulatory minority shareholders in curbing corporate fraud, yielding consistent and robust results. The findings of the mechanism tests indicate that CSISC shareholding significantly reduces the propensity for fraud while increasing the probability of fraud detection. The results of heterogeneity tests show that the effect of CSISC shareholdings on corporate fraud is more pronounced in firms with severe internal agency problems and poorer external governance environments. Additional analyses examine the impact of CSISC shareholdings on different types of corporate fraud and show that it significantly reduces disclosure and operational fraud. This research has important implications for improving minority shareholder protection in countries with concentrated ownership structures and for constraining corporate fraud.</span></p></div>","PeriodicalId":47996,"journal":{"name":"British Accounting Review","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Regulator as a minority shareholder and corporate fraud: Quasi-natural experiment evidence from the pilot project of China Securities Investor Services Center\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.bar.2023.101242\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><p>The China Securities Investor Services Centre (CSISC) is a unique governance mechanism in China, backed by the Chinese regulator. This institution holds 100 shares of each public firm in the pilot<span> regions and monitors large shareholders by exercising its rights. Using a difference-in-difference (DID) methodology, the study investigates a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2013 to 2017 to evaluate the role of regulatory minority shareholders in curbing corporate fraud, yielding consistent and robust results. The findings of the mechanism tests indicate that CSISC shareholding significantly reduces the propensity for fraud while increasing the probability of fraud detection. The results of heterogeneity tests show that the effect of CSISC shareholdings on corporate fraud is more pronounced in firms with severe internal agency problems and poorer external governance environments. Additional analyses examine the impact of CSISC shareholdings on different types of corporate fraud and show that it significantly reduces disclosure and operational fraud. This research has important implications for improving minority shareholder protection in countries with concentrated ownership structures and for constraining corporate fraud.</span></p></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47996,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"British Accounting Review\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":5.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2024-09-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"British Accounting Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"91\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0890838923000896\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"管理学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"British Accounting Review","FirstCategoryId":"91","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0890838923000896","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"管理学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Regulator as a minority shareholder and corporate fraud: Quasi-natural experiment evidence from the pilot project of China Securities Investor Services Center
The China Securities Investor Services Centre (CSISC) is a unique governance mechanism in China, backed by the Chinese regulator. This institution holds 100 shares of each public firm in the pilot regions and monitors large shareholders by exercising its rights. Using a difference-in-difference (DID) methodology, the study investigates a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2013 to 2017 to evaluate the role of regulatory minority shareholders in curbing corporate fraud, yielding consistent and robust results. The findings of the mechanism tests indicate that CSISC shareholding significantly reduces the propensity for fraud while increasing the probability of fraud detection. The results of heterogeneity tests show that the effect of CSISC shareholdings on corporate fraud is more pronounced in firms with severe internal agency problems and poorer external governance environments. Additional analyses examine the impact of CSISC shareholdings on different types of corporate fraud and show that it significantly reduces disclosure and operational fraud. This research has important implications for improving minority shareholder protection in countries with concentrated ownership structures and for constraining corporate fraud.
期刊介绍:
The British Accounting Review*is pleased to publish original scholarly papers across the whole spectrum of accounting and finance. The journal is eclectic and pluralistic and contributions are welcomed across a wide range of research methodologies (e.g. analytical, archival, experimental, survey and qualitative case methods) and topics (e.g. financial accounting, management accounting, finance and financial management, auditing, public sector accounting, social and environmental accounting; accounting education and accounting history), evidence from UK and non-UK sources are equally acceptable.