Counterinsurgency’s Undead Prose: A Reply to Janet Cherry’s Review of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Africa

Janet Cherry ’ s review of my book is confused, in some places demonstrating a gross misreading and in other places devolving to quibbles over details in ways that do not challenge – and sometimes even con fi rm – my primary thesis. Cherry insists that ‘ to argue that the current problems of South Africa are somehow linked to the counterinsurgency strategy of the past is a “ long stretch ” , to put it mildly, and verges on conspiracy theory ’ . 1 But she vastly over-states her case and makes a crude caricature of my book ’ s actual argument. I do not, as she claims, blame apartheid counterinsurgency for all the ills plaguing South Africa today, including unemployment, corruption, and state capture. Rather, my book shows that during the pivotal 10 to 15 years following South Africa ’ s 1994 transition to democracy, counterinsurgency legacies played a crucial and thus far undertheorised role in undermining state institutions and democratic norms, thereby contributing to the weakness in South Africa ’ s democracy today. As Cherry must know, I am hardly the fi rst to argue that elements of the apartheid regime ’ s covert war continued to destabilise South Africa after April 1994. Previous literature has already explored this phenomenon, giving credence to President Nelson Mandela ’ s claims that in attempting to overcome apartheid ’ s overwhelming legacies of poverty, inequality, and crime, his government faced old-guard security force elements aiming to desta-bilise the new democracy. 2