Chicago, Harvard, Freiburg, or considerations for Single Market integration? Analysis of theoretical and ideational insights underpinning the European Commission’s merger control with exponential random graph models

ABSTRACT The European Commission has central authority over the European Union’s merger control. It is therefore responsible for making important merger decisions that are bound to affect vast markets and EU and non-EU market players, with significant implications for wider economic, political, and societal segments. These decisions are often informed by theoretical and ideational insights from various schools of competition analysis and economic theories, or they are guided by non-economic objectives. This article analyzes merger cases cleared under the current European Union Merger Regulation (EUMR) in an attempt to reveal whether the following insights underpin the Commission’s merger control: the Chicago School, Harvard School, Freiburg School, and considerations for Single Market integration. The analysis is conducted by employing an exponential random graph model (ERGM) approach.