冲突中误解的进化稳定性与进化

Q3 Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Studies in Microeconomics Pub Date : 2022-12-09 DOI:10.1177/23210222221130207

G. S. Parashari, Vimal Kumar

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们发现进化稳定策略(ESS)和进化稳定偏好(ESP)在冲突模型中表现为内生奖励的两两竞争博弈。我们的研究将ESS下的过高出价归因于对冲突中竞争对手的各种属性的误解，这种误解是通过ESP进化而来的。我们发现，玩家倾向于过度感知竞争对手的资源禀赋，而这反过来又导致了ESS下玩家更具攻击性的行为。我们还在内生奖励设置中使用冲突支出的概念来表明，ESP下对竞争对手的错误感知会导致更高水平的资源耗散。JEL分类:D70, D72, D74

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Evolutionary Stability and Evolution of Misperceptions in Conflict

We find Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) and Evolutionary Stable Preference (ESP) in conflict modeled as a pairwise contest game for an endogenous prize. Our study attributes overbidding under ESS to misperceptions about various attributes of rival players in a conflict that evolved through ESP. We show that players tend to over perceive the resource endowments of rival players and this, in turn, gives rise to the more aggressive behaviour of players under ESS. We also use the notion of conflict expenditure in an endogenous prize setting to show that the false perception about the rival players under ESP gives rise to higher levels of dissipation of resources into appropriation. JEL Classifications: D70, D72, D74

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来源期刊

Studies in Microeconomics Economics, Econometrics and Finance-Economics, Econometrics and Finance (all)

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Studies in Microeconomics seeks high quality theoretical as well as applied (or empirical) research in all areas of microeconomics (broadly defined to include other avenues of decision science such as psychology, political science and organizational behavior). In particular, we encourage submissions in new areas of Microeconomics such as in the fields of Experimental economics and Behavioral Economics. All manuscripts will be subjected to a peer-review process. The intended audience of the journal are professional economists and young researchers with an interest and expertise in microeconomics and above. In addition to full-length articles MIC is interested in publishing and promoting shorter refereed articles (letters and notes) that are pertinent to the specialist in the field of Microeconomics (broadly defined). MIC will periodically publish special issues with themes of particular interest, including articles solicited from leading scholars as well as authoritative survey articles and meta-analysis on the themed topic. We will also publish book reviews related to microeconomics, and MIC encourages publishing articles from policy practitioners dealing with microeconomic issues that have policy relevance under the section Policy Analysis and Debate.