{"title":"根源:Artis诉哥伦比亚特区案中的隐喻与司法哲学","authors":"","doi":"10.18060/27224","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This Article examines how the metaphors in judicial opinions reveal judicial theories of lawmaking and judicial philosophies. It does so through a close reading of Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion and Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594 (2018). \nArtis was about what the phrase “shall be tolled” means in the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. §1367. Does it pause the statute of limitations while a state-law claim is in federal court or keep it running? In holding that Congress used “stop the clock” tolling, an “off-the-shelf” legal device that pauses the statute of limitations, Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion uses conventional, mechanistic metaphors. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent uses more elaborate, agrarian metaphors to argue that Congress used a stricter “grace period” version of tolling because “[w]hen Congress replants the roots of preexisting law in the federal code, this Court assumes it brings with it the surrounding soil.” \nThis Article shows that Justice Ginsburg’s mechanistic metaphors describe lawmaking like engineering and bespeak a mode of judicial interpretation based on purpose and precedent—while Justice Gorsuch’s agrarian metaphors hark back to a pastoral conception of lawmaking and interpretation “rooted” in a mythical common-law history and tradition. It then compares Justice Ginsburg’s moreunderstated use of conventional metaphors to Justice Gorsuch’s more performative metaphorical technique, arguing that their different rhetorical strategies reflect their different visions of lawmaking and interpretive philosophies. And it closes by showing how close attention to the metaphors theyuse can reveal the flaws in each approach.","PeriodicalId":81517,"journal":{"name":"Indiana law review","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Rooted: Metaphors and Judicial Philosophy in Artis v. District of Columbia\",\"authors\":\"\",\"doi\":\"10.18060/27224\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This Article examines how the metaphors in judicial opinions reveal judicial theories of lawmaking and judicial philosophies. It does so through a close reading of Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion and Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594 (2018). \\nArtis was about what the phrase “shall be tolled” means in the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. §1367. 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It then compares Justice Ginsburg’s moreunderstated use of conventional metaphors to Justice Gorsuch’s more performative metaphorical technique, arguing that their different rhetorical strategies reflect their different visions of lawmaking and interpretive philosophies. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
本文考察了司法意见中的隐喻是如何揭示司法立法理论和司法哲学的。它是通过仔细阅读金斯伯格大法官的多数意见和戈萨奇大法官在Artis v.District of Columbia一案中的反对意见来做到这一点的,138 s.Ct.594(2018)。Artis谈到了《美国法典》第28卷第1367节联邦补充管辖法规中“应收费”一词的含义。它是在州法律索赔提交联邦法院时暂停诉讼时效,还是继续执行?金斯伯格大法官的多数意见认为,国会使用了“停止计时”收费,这是一种暂停诉讼时效的“现成”法律手段,使用了传统的机械隐喻。戈萨奇大法官的异议使用了更复杂的农业隐喻,认为国会使用了更严格的“宽限期”收费,因为“当国会重新种植联邦法典中现有法律的根源时,本法院认为它会带来周围的土壤。这篇文章表明,金斯伯格大法官的机械隐喻将立法描述为工程,并预示着一种基于目的和先例的司法解释模式——而戈萨奇大法官的农业隐喻则让人想起了“植根”于神话般的普通法历史和传统中的立法和解释的田园概念。然后,它将金斯伯格大法官对传统隐喻的低调使用与戈萨奇大法官更具表演性的隐喻技巧进行了比较,认为他们不同的修辞策略反映了他们对立法和解释哲学的不同看法。最后,它展示了对他们使用的隐喻的密切关注可以揭示每种方法的缺陷。
Rooted: Metaphors and Judicial Philosophy in Artis v. District of Columbia
This Article examines how the metaphors in judicial opinions reveal judicial theories of lawmaking and judicial philosophies. It does so through a close reading of Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion and Justice Gorsuch’s dissenting opinion in Artis v. District of Columbia, 138 S. Ct. 594 (2018).
Artis was about what the phrase “shall be tolled” means in the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. §1367. Does it pause the statute of limitations while a state-law claim is in federal court or keep it running? In holding that Congress used “stop the clock” tolling, an “off-the-shelf” legal device that pauses the statute of limitations, Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion uses conventional, mechanistic metaphors. Justice Gorsuch’s dissent uses more elaborate, agrarian metaphors to argue that Congress used a stricter “grace period” version of tolling because “[w]hen Congress replants the roots of preexisting law in the federal code, this Court assumes it brings with it the surrounding soil.”
This Article shows that Justice Ginsburg’s mechanistic metaphors describe lawmaking like engineering and bespeak a mode of judicial interpretation based on purpose and precedent—while Justice Gorsuch’s agrarian metaphors hark back to a pastoral conception of lawmaking and interpretation “rooted” in a mythical common-law history and tradition. It then compares Justice Ginsburg’s moreunderstated use of conventional metaphors to Justice Gorsuch’s more performative metaphorical technique, arguing that their different rhetorical strategies reflect their different visions of lawmaking and interpretive philosophies. And it closes by showing how close attention to the metaphors theyuse can reveal the flaws in each approach.