{"title":"尊严争议","authors":"Connor M. Ewing","doi":"10.1017/jlc.2022.18","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n Obergefell v. Hodges, the 2015 Supreme Court decision establishing a constitutional right for same-sex couples to marry, marked the first time in the Court’s history that justices explicitly disagreed over the meaning and requirements of human dignity. In his dissenting opinion Clarence Thomas sought to reclaim rather than simply reject the language of dignity, advancing a conception of dignity that differed sharply from the conception embraced by the majority. Using this disagreement as a point of departure, this article demonstrates how dignity has served as an extra-textual value that underpins divergent visions of American constitutionalism that, in turn, inform interpretations of the Constitution’s text and history.","PeriodicalId":44478,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Law and Courts","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Dignity Disputed\",\"authors\":\"Connor M. Ewing\",\"doi\":\"10.1017/jlc.2022.18\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n Obergefell v. Hodges, the 2015 Supreme Court decision establishing a constitutional right for same-sex couples to marry, marked the first time in the Court’s history that justices explicitly disagreed over the meaning and requirements of human dignity. In his dissenting opinion Clarence Thomas sought to reclaim rather than simply reject the language of dignity, advancing a conception of dignity that differed sharply from the conception embraced by the majority. Using this disagreement as a point of departure, this article demonstrates how dignity has served as an extra-textual value that underpins divergent visions of American constitutionalism that, in turn, inform interpretations of the Constitution’s text and history.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44478,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Law and Courts\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-03-22\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Law and Courts\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2022.18\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Law and Courts","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/jlc.2022.18","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
奥贝格费尔诉霍奇斯案(Obergefell v. Hodges)是最高法院2015年的一项裁决,确立了同性伴侣结婚的宪法权利,这标志着最高法院历史上大法官们首次在人类尊严的含义和要求上出现明确的分歧。在他的反对意见中,克拉伦斯·托马斯试图收回而不是简单地拒绝尊严的语言,提出了一种与大多数人所接受的概念截然不同的尊严概念。本文以这种分歧为出发点,展示了尊严如何作为一种文本外的价值,支撑着对美国宪政的不同看法,进而为对宪法文本和历史的解释提供信息。
Obergefell v. Hodges, the 2015 Supreme Court decision establishing a constitutional right for same-sex couples to marry, marked the first time in the Court’s history that justices explicitly disagreed over the meaning and requirements of human dignity. In his dissenting opinion Clarence Thomas sought to reclaim rather than simply reject the language of dignity, advancing a conception of dignity that differed sharply from the conception embraced by the majority. Using this disagreement as a point of departure, this article demonstrates how dignity has served as an extra-textual value that underpins divergent visions of American constitutionalism that, in turn, inform interpretations of the Constitution’s text and history.