为什么现实主义辩论对科学政策很重要:以人脑计划为例

IF 0.1 Q4 HISTORY & PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Jamie Shaw
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引用次数: 13

摘要

对于现实主义/反现实主义辩论的价值,有很多人持怀疑态度。更具体地说,许多人认为现实主义和反现实主义的合理表述在任何方面都没有实质性的不同(Fine 1986;斯坦1989;布莱克本2002)。在本文中,我反对这一趋势,通过更深入地研究历史记录,论证辩论的假设解决方案如何对我们的理论追求标准和科学政策产生重要影响。为此,我重新审视了Arthur Fine关于现实主义的“一小部分”论证,并展示了辩论如何集中在连续性(无论是本体论的还是结构的)是否应该作为理论未来成果的一个指标上。然后,我通过考虑人脑计划的案例来演示这些争论是如何在实践中发挥作用的。最后,我将考虑制定元归纳的一些潜在的实际考虑。通过这样做,我为当前的辩论贡献了三个见解:1)证明了现实主义/反现实主义的辩论是一场实质性的辩论,2)将现实主义/反现实主义的辩论与理论选择和追求的辩论联系起来,3)展示了元归纳的现实意义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Why the Realism Debate Matters for Science Policy: The Case of the Human Brain Project
There has been a great deal of skepticism towards the value of the realism/anti-realism debate. More specifically, many have argued that plausible formulations of realism and anti-realism do not differ substantially in any way (Fine 1986; Stein 1989; Blackburn 2002). In this paper, I argue against this trend by demonstrating how a hypothetical resolution of the debate, through deeper engagement with the historical record, has important implications for our criterion of theory pursuit and science policy. I do this by revisiting Arthur Fine’s ‘small handful’ argument for realism and show how the debate centers on whether continuity (either ontological or structural) should be an indicator for the future fruitfulness of a theory. I then demonstrate how these debates work in practice by considering the case of the Human Brain Project. I close by considering some potential practical considerations of formulating meta-inductions. By doing this, I contribute three insights to the current debate: 1) demonstrate how the realism/anti-realism debate is a substantive debate, 2) connect debates about realism/anti-realism to debates about theory choice and pursuit, and 3) show the practical significance of meta-inductions.
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