Was Spinoza a Pagan?

Spinoza once remarked in a letter to his friend Hugo Boxel: “To me the authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates is not worth much.” The clarity of this statement has not deterred even experienced readers of Spinoza’s works from associating his philosophy with the philosophers of classical antiquity. Steven Nadler, in his latest study of Spinoza, cogently shows that the theme of freedom ties together Spinoza’s major works on metaphysics, ethics, and politics. He brings forth valuable insights that help readers comprehend and appreciate the unique contribution of Spinoza towards a metaphysical, moral, psychological, and political understanding of a truly free, happy, and rational existence, one that celebrates life over death. However, the core premise of Nadler’s argument, that Spinoza is indebted to pagan philosophy (especially Stoicism), seriously undermines the coherence of his study. Although Nadler is certain that “Spinoza fits well in this broad eudaimonistic tradition” represented by Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, he provides no substantive evidence for this thesis (10). What Nadler’s insights sometimes demonstrate, despite his intent, is the utterly biblical foundation of Spinoza’s philosophy of freedom and life. Although Spinoza is typically read as a defender of a naturalistic determinism that disallows freedom, Nadler persuasively outlines the paradox that Spinoza’s articulation of this necessity does not contradict his robust conceptualization of freedom. Spinoza’s rejection of free will—the superstitious belief that the faculty of the will enables human beings to freely ignore the psychological causes (e.g., passions) that determine their actions—is not a repudiation of true freedom. Rather, the authentic practice of the free life requires the recognition of the necessary truth that one cannot be free unless one lives according to reason. A life dedicated to reason, in turn, does not and cannot willfully extinguish the existence of the passions. What a rational understanding of freedom can enable is active control of one’s passions, as opposed to a surrender to them. As Nadler explains through his analyses of both Spinoza’s Ethics and Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, the free person “acts rather than reacts. He will certainly do what he wishes, but what he wishes—and thus his behavior—is guided from within, by knowledge rather than by imagination, sentiment, or feeling” (12; author’s emphasis).