“好”解释关于原因的五个谜题

IF 1.6 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
S. Finlay
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引用次数: 4

摘要

这意味着什么,比如预测会下雨,成为采取雨伞等行动或相信会下雨等态度的规范理由?根据一种流行的观点,“原因”的概念都是某种解释的概念。但解释什么?在发展这一观点的一种方式中,代理人S执行动作a的规范性理由的概念是解释为什么S做a是好的(在某种程度上)。这种作为善的解释的理由假说(REG)有许多优点和支持者。但就像每一种规范性原因理论一样,它也面临着一些重大挑战,这促使更多的哲学家对它能否解释所有规范性原因持怀疑态度。本文展示了如何通过关注善的概念来解决关于规范性原因的五个不同的谜题,并观察它——以及因此谈论原因——是如何对上下文敏感的。与其简单地问某些事实是否是S做A的原因,我们还需要探究语境如何影响将一个事实描述为S做A“原因”是否正确。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A “Good” Explanation of Five Puzzles about Reasons
What does it mean for something, like the fact that rain is forecast, to be a normative reason for an action like taking your umbrella, or attitude like believing it will rain? According to a popular view, concepts of “reasons” are all concepts of some kind of explanation. But explanations of what? On one way of developing this idea, the concept of a normative reason for an agent S to perform an action A is that of an explanation why it would be good (in some way, to some degree) for S to do A. This Reasons as Explanations of Goodness hypothesis (REG) has numerous virtues and champions. But like every theory of normative reasons it faces some significant challenges, which prompt many more philosophers to be skeptical that it can account for all normative reasons. This paper demonstrates how five different puzzles about normative reasons can be solved by paying attention to the concept of goodness, and observing how it—and consequently, talk about reasons—is sensitive to context. Rather than asking simply whether certain facts are reasons for S to do A, we need to explore how context affects whether it is correct to describe a fact as “a reason” for S to do A.
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CiteScore
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