忽略相关的说服：一个完全操纵的结果

IF 8.1 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

American Economic Review-Insights Pub Date : 2022-03-01 DOI:10.1257/aeri.20210007

Gilat Levy, Inés Moreno de Barreda, R. Razin

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引用次数: 8

摘要

我们考虑一个信息设计问题，其中发送者试图说服具有“相关性忽视”的接收者，即无法理解信号可能是相关的。我们证明了具有无限数量信号的发送方可以完全操纵接收方。具体地说，发送方可以诱导接收方持有她希望持有的任何与状态相关的后验。如果发送者只希望诱导一个状态无关的后验，她可以使用完全相关的信号，但通常她需要设计更复杂的相关结构。(凝胶d82, d83)

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Persuasion with Correlation Neglect: A Full Manipulation Result

We consider an information design problem in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver that has “correlation neglect,” i.e., fails to understand that signals might be correlated. We show that a sender with unlimited number of signals can fully manipulate the receiver. Specifically, the sender can induce the receiver to hold any state-dependent posterior she wishes to. If the sender only wishes to induce a state-independent posterior, she can use fully correlated signals, but generally she needs to design more involved correlation structures. (JEL D82, D83)

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来源期刊

American Economic Review-Insights ECONOMICS-

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期刊介绍： The journal American Economic Review: Insights (AER: Insights) is a publication that caters to a wide audience interested in economics. It shares the same standards of quality and significance as the American Economic Review (AER) but focuses specifically on papers that offer important insights communicated concisely. AER: Insights releases four issues annually, covering a diverse range of topics in economics.