{"title":"思想实验","authors":"Roy A. Clouser","doi":"10.1163/23528230-bja10054","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nThis paper presents a new argument against philosophical theories based on arguments in favor of ontological reductions. The argument is an experiment in thought that has transcendental force, because it demonstrates the impossibility of forming a concept of anything with a reductionist nature. So although we consider as examples only theories that try to reduce everything in accordance with the currently popular materialisms or dualism, the argument applies as well to every sort of reduction theory whatever.","PeriodicalId":38515,"journal":{"name":"Philosophia Reformata","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-11-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"An Experiment in Thought\",\"authors\":\"Roy A. Clouser\",\"doi\":\"10.1163/23528230-bja10054\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\nThis paper presents a new argument against philosophical theories based on arguments in favor of ontological reductions. The argument is an experiment in thought that has transcendental force, because it demonstrates the impossibility of forming a concept of anything with a reductionist nature. So although we consider as examples only theories that try to reduce everything in accordance with the currently popular materialisms or dualism, the argument applies as well to every sort of reduction theory whatever.\",\"PeriodicalId\":38515,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Philosophia Reformata\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-11-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Philosophia Reformata\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1163/23528230-bja10054\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"Arts and Humanities\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Philosophia Reformata","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1163/23528230-bja10054","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"Arts and Humanities","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper presents a new argument against philosophical theories based on arguments in favor of ontological reductions. The argument is an experiment in thought that has transcendental force, because it demonstrates the impossibility of forming a concept of anything with a reductionist nature. So although we consider as examples only theories that try to reduce everything in accordance with the currently popular materialisms or dualism, the argument applies as well to every sort of reduction theory whatever.