关于法律规范性的无野心观点的一个问题

Q2 Arts and Humanities

Revus Pub Date : 2019-03-01 DOI:10.4000/REVUS.4542

Stefano Bertea

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引用次数: 1

摘要

在这篇文章中，我讨论了所谓的“法律规范性的无野心观点”，这是布莱恩·比克斯(Brian Bix)专门提出的理论。虽然我同意Bix的观点，即法律规范性不应该被假定为默认的道德规范性，但我认为法律的规范性不能被限定为规范性的一种特殊形式，因为，按照Bix的说法，法律规范性的质量最好被理解为真实的。也就是说，法律对其主体作出的规范性主张确实解决了一般的实践问题:我们应该做什么?

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A problem for the unambitious view of legal normativity

In this contribution, I discuss the so-called “unambitious view of legal normativity”, as it is specifically theorised by Brian Bix. While I agree with Bix that legal normativity should not be assumed to be reducible by default to moral normativity, I will argue that the normativity of law cannot be qualified as a sui generis form of normativity, for, pace Bix, the quality of legal normativity is best understood as genuine. That is, the normative claims the law makes on its subjects do address the general practical question: What ought we to do?

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来源期刊

Revus Arts and Humanities-Philosophy

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

0.00%

发文量