权力下放层面的政治:地方和区域权力下放的替代

IF 4.5 1区 社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Joan Ricart-Huguet, Emily A. Sellars
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引用次数: 1

摘要

当代的权力下放大多发生在地方(区)层面,而不是地区(省)层面。为什么?作者提出了一种理论,强调了中央政府绕过地方一级政府的政治动机,倾向于将权力下放到更小、更分散的单位。区域分权可以利用公共服务提供的规模经济和范围经济,但它也使政治反对派能够更有效地扩大规模。地方分权在政治风险较小的情况下提供了区域分权的一些好处,使其成为中央政府的一个不完美但有吸引力的替代品。本文以非洲和拉丁美洲的案例为例,讨论了在分裂的社会中,战略性地方分权何时以及如何成为维持政治控制的有效策略,为什么有时政府可能会选择区域分权或(再)集权,以及分权水平的选择如何取决于政治地理和历史以及经济因素。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Politics of Decentralization Level: Local and Regional Devolution as Substitutes
abstract:Most contemporary decentralization has occurred at the local (district) rather than the regional (provincial) level. Why? The authors advance a theory highlighting the political incentives of central authorities to bypass the regional tier of government in favor of decentralizing to smaller, more fragmented units. Regional decentralization can capitalize on economies of scale and scope in public service provision, but it also enables political opposition to scale more effectively. Local decentralization provides some of the benefits of regional decentralization at less political risk, making it an imperfect but attractive substitute for central authorities. Drawing on cases from Africa and Latin America, this article discusses when and how strategic local decentralization can be an effective strategy to maintain political control in divided societies, why sometimes governments may instead opt for regional decentralization or (re)centralization, and how the choice of decentralization level depends on political geography and history as well as economic factors.
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来源期刊
World Politics
World Politics Multiple-
CiteScore
8.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
24
期刊介绍: World Politics, founded in 1948, is an internationally renowned quarterly journal of political science published in both print and online versions. Open to contributions by scholars, World Politics invites submission of research articles that make theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature, review articles, and research notes bearing on problems in international relations and comparative politics. The journal does not publish articles on current affairs, policy pieces, or narratives of a journalistic nature. Articles submitted for consideration are unsolicited, except for review articles, which are usually commissioned. Published for the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Affairs
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