n人最终出价仲裁:均衡中的调和数

Pub Date : 2023-03-31 DOI:10.1080/00029890.2023.2188049

Brian R. Powers

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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要我们考虑了如何将最终报价仲裁机制应用于N个参与者之间试图分割一个财富单位的谈判。在博弈模型中，仲裁者从Dirichlet分布中选择一个公平的分割。在均匀概率分布的情况下，均衡策略是调和数的函数。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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N-Player Final-Offer Arbitration: Harmonic Numbers in Equilibrium

Abstract We consider how a mechanism of final-offer arbitration may be applied to a negotiation between N players attempting to split a unit of wealth. The game model is defined where the arbitrator chooses a fair split from a Dirichlet distribution. For the case of a uniform probability distribution the equilibrium strategy is found as a function of the Harmonic numbers.

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