{"title":"克尔凯郭尔论苏格拉底的日常生活","authors":"Rico Sneller","doi":"10.1080/21692327.2019.1649602","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In this article, I argue that Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Socrates’ daimonion in The Concept of Irony should be read in light of his notion of the demonic in The Concept of Anxiety, and vice versa. Whereas the first should primarily be seen as an exemplification of philosophical transcendental consciousness, the second assumes a more strictly ‘moral’ connotation (‘anxiety about the good’). If the notion of the demonic in The Concept of Anxiety draws upon the Socratic daimonion in The Concept of Irony, this will have implications for philosophy and science in so far as they take a transcendental consciousness for granted. However, Kierkegaard’s continued reference to, if not identification with, Socrates, prevents us from immobilising Kierkegaard’s ‘own’ philosophy, as though the Socratic position can ever be definitively overcome. The ‘enclosed reserve’ of the demonic is rather philosophy’s weak spot.","PeriodicalId":42052,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.3000,"publicationDate":"2020-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21692327.2019.1649602","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Kierkegaard on Socrates’ daimonion\",\"authors\":\"Rico Sneller\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/21692327.2019.1649602\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT In this article, I argue that Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Socrates’ daimonion in The Concept of Irony should be read in light of his notion of the demonic in The Concept of Anxiety, and vice versa. Whereas the first should primarily be seen as an exemplification of philosophical transcendental consciousness, the second assumes a more strictly ‘moral’ connotation (‘anxiety about the good’). If the notion of the demonic in The Concept of Anxiety draws upon the Socratic daimonion in The Concept of Irony, this will have implications for philosophy and science in so far as they take a transcendental consciousness for granted. However, Kierkegaard’s continued reference to, if not identification with, Socrates, prevents us from immobilising Kierkegaard’s ‘own’ philosophy, as though the Socratic position can ever be definitively overcome. The ‘enclosed reserve’ of the demonic is rather philosophy’s weak spot.\",\"PeriodicalId\":42052,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.3000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/21692327.2019.1649602\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2019.1649602\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Philosophy and Theology","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/21692327.2019.1649602","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT In this article, I argue that Kierkegaard’s interpretation of Socrates’ daimonion in The Concept of Irony should be read in light of his notion of the demonic in The Concept of Anxiety, and vice versa. Whereas the first should primarily be seen as an exemplification of philosophical transcendental consciousness, the second assumes a more strictly ‘moral’ connotation (‘anxiety about the good’). If the notion of the demonic in The Concept of Anxiety draws upon the Socratic daimonion in The Concept of Irony, this will have implications for philosophy and science in so far as they take a transcendental consciousness for granted. However, Kierkegaard’s continued reference to, if not identification with, Socrates, prevents us from immobilising Kierkegaard’s ‘own’ philosophy, as though the Socratic position can ever be definitively overcome. The ‘enclosed reserve’ of the demonic is rather philosophy’s weak spot.
期刊介绍:
International Journal of Philosophy and Theology publishes scholarly articles and reviews that concern the intersection between philosophy and theology. It aims to stimulate the creative discussion between various traditions, for example the analytical and the continental traditions. Articles should exhibit high-level scholarship but should be readable for those coming from other philosophical traditions. Fields of interest are: philosophy, especially philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and philosophical ethics, and systematic theology, for example fundamental theology, dogmatic and moral theology. Contributions focusing on the history of these disciplines are also welcome, especially when they are relevant to contemporary discussions.