{"title":"政府质量与家族企业治理对研发产出的交互影响","authors":"Feng Xiaoti","doi":"10.1108/CCSM-05-2017-0065","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nPurpose\nThe purpose of this paper is to focus on the interactive effects of intrinsic and extrinsic factors on R&D output by analysing Chinese-listed industrial family firms. It proposes modelling the moderating influence of quality of government (QOG) on the relationship between family firm governance types (family control and family management) and R&D output from the “twin agency” perspective (Stulz, 2005).\n\n\nDesign/methodology/approach\nThe data set is organised as an unbalanced panel. This study exploits random-effects GLS regression, analysing both cross-sectional and time variation, and estimating the mean effects. The GLS model corrects the variance- and sequence-related problems of linear model random items and remains consistent and robust when the error term is heteroscedastic and non-normally distributed.\n\n\nFindings\nThe findings provide several empirical conclusions: in areas with a higher QOG, family firms with greater family control (i.e. voting rights of the board) achieve more R&D output than firms with less family control; and QOG has no significant interactive effects with family management (i.e. the ratio of family managers among top managers) on R&D output. The main contribution of this paper is to show that in areas with a higher QOG, greater R&D output for family firms depends on greater family control rather than family management. These findings give a better understanding of the interactive influence of inside and outside agency problems in family firms in general and their R&D output in particular across different cities, and may help both family firms’ leaders and government policy makers to foster innovation by controlling intrinsic and extrinsic agency problems.\n\n\nResearch limitations/implications\nTo date, most family firm innovation research has concentrated upon governance and R&D behaviour (Block, 2012; Brinkerink and Bammens, 2018; Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Lee and O’Neill, 2003). Few studies, however, have been performed from the major strategic (control) and operational (management) orientations, into the influence of outside (QOG) and inside (governance) factors upon innovation. This study attempts to fill that gap. It uses patent counts to measure the economic and technological importance of innovation. It argues that different QOG may lead major controllers or executives in family firms to have different motivations, and hence to approach innovation differently from the agency perspective.\n\n\nPractical implications\nThe main contribution of this study is to show that in areas with a higher QOG, higher R&D outputs of family firms depend on higher family control rather than family management, due to the interactive influence of inside and outside agency problems. When family management is high, the direct effect is high, because family management may reduce the principal–agent agency cost (PAAC), but the interactive effect of QOG and family management is not significant. In areas with high QOG, although family management may reduce the PAAC, principal–principal and altruism agency costs may increase. Based on the twin agency theory, differing inside expropriation issues between strategic (family control) and operational (family management) orientations are the main differentiator, one accentuated by the external expropriation issues of QOG.\n\n\nSocial implications\nThese results contribute to a better understanding of family firms in general and their R&D output in particular across different cities. The findings also show of interest for government policy makers who should be aware of the significance of FFs’ characteristics for innovation and their incentives to conduct R&D projects.\n\n\nOriginality/value\nThe research uses Stulz’s (2005) “Twin agency” concept to analyse the interacting effects of state-level agency problems of governments with firm-level agency problems of family firms on R&D output. This paper answers the main question: What are the interactive effects of QOG and family firm governance on R&D output? The main contribution of the paper is to bridging the current gap in the literature.\n","PeriodicalId":51820,"journal":{"name":"Cross Cultural & Strategic Management","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2018-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1108/CCSM-05-2017-0065","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Interactive effects of quality of government and family firm governance on R&D output\",\"authors\":\"Feng Xiaoti\",\"doi\":\"10.1108/CCSM-05-2017-0065\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\nPurpose\\nThe purpose of this paper is to focus on the interactive effects of intrinsic and extrinsic factors on R&D output by analysing Chinese-listed industrial family firms. 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These findings give a better understanding of the interactive influence of inside and outside agency problems in family firms in general and their R&D output in particular across different cities, and may help both family firms’ leaders and government policy makers to foster innovation by controlling intrinsic and extrinsic agency problems.\\n\\n\\nResearch limitations/implications\\nTo date, most family firm innovation research has concentrated upon governance and R&D behaviour (Block, 2012; Brinkerink and Bammens, 2018; Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Lee and O’Neill, 2003). Few studies, however, have been performed from the major strategic (control) and operational (management) orientations, into the influence of outside (QOG) and inside (governance) factors upon innovation. This study attempts to fill that gap. It uses patent counts to measure the economic and technological importance of innovation. 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引用次数: 5
摘要
目的通过对中国上市工业家族企业的分析,探讨内外因素对企业研发产出的交互影响。本文提出从“孪生代理”的角度对政府质量(QOG)对家族企业治理类型(家族控制和家族管理)与研发产出之间关系的调节影响进行建模(Stulz, 2005)。设计/方法/方法数据集被组织成一个不平衡的面板。本研究利用随机效应GLS回归,分析横截面和时间变化,并估计平均效应。GLS模型修正了线性模型随机项目的方差和序列相关问题,并在误差项为异方差和非正态分布时保持一致性和鲁棒性。研究结果表明:在质量绩效高的地区,家族控制(即董事会投票权)较大的家族企业的研发产出高于家族控制较少的企业;QOG与家族管理(即家族管理者占高管的比例)对研发产出的交互作用不显著。本文的主要贡献在于表明,在质量绩效较高的地区,家族企业更大的研发产出取决于更大的家族控制而不是家族管理。这些发现有助于更好地理解家族企业内部和外部代理问题的交互影响,特别是不同城市家族企业的研发产出,并有助于家族企业领导人和政府决策者通过控制内部和外部代理问题来促进创新。迄今为止,大多数家族企业创新研究都集中在治理和研发行为上(Block, 2012;Brinkerink and Bammens, 2018;克里斯曼和帕特尔,2012;李和奥尼尔,2003)。然而,很少有研究从主要的战略(控制)和经营(管理)的方向,到外部(QOG)和内部(治理)的因素对创新的影响。这项研究试图填补这一空白。它使用专利数量来衡量创新的经济和技术重要性。本文认为,不同的QOG可能导致家族企业的主要控制人或高管具有不同的动机,从而从代理角度不同地对待创新。实践启示本研究的主要贡献在于,在质量绩效较高的地区,由于内外代理问题的交互影响,家族企业的高研发产出依赖于较高的家族控制而非家族管理。当家族管理程度高时,直接效应高,因为家族管理可以降低委托代理代理成本(PAAC),但QOG与家族管理的交互效应不显著。在质量目标高的地区,虽然家族管理可以降低PAAC,但委托人-委托人和利他主义代理成本可能会增加。基于双代理理论,战略取向(家族控制)和经营取向(家族管理)之间不同的内部征用问题是主要的区别,而质量管理集团的外部征用问题则凸显了这一点。这些结果有助于更好地理解家族企业的总体情况,特别是不同城市的家族企业的研发产出。研究结果也显示了政府决策者的兴趣,他们应该意识到FFs特征对创新的重要性以及他们开展研发项目的激励。本研究采用Stulz(2005)的“孪生代理”概念,分析了政府的国家级代理问题与家族企业的企业级代理问题对研发产出的交互作用。本文回答了主要问题:QOG和家族企业治理对研发产出的交互作用是什么?本文的主要贡献是弥补了目前文献中的差距。
Interactive effects of quality of government and family firm governance on R&D output
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to focus on the interactive effects of intrinsic and extrinsic factors on R&D output by analysing Chinese-listed industrial family firms. It proposes modelling the moderating influence of quality of government (QOG) on the relationship between family firm governance types (family control and family management) and R&D output from the “twin agency” perspective (Stulz, 2005).
Design/methodology/approach
The data set is organised as an unbalanced panel. This study exploits random-effects GLS regression, analysing both cross-sectional and time variation, and estimating the mean effects. The GLS model corrects the variance- and sequence-related problems of linear model random items and remains consistent and robust when the error term is heteroscedastic and non-normally distributed.
Findings
The findings provide several empirical conclusions: in areas with a higher QOG, family firms with greater family control (i.e. voting rights of the board) achieve more R&D output than firms with less family control; and QOG has no significant interactive effects with family management (i.e. the ratio of family managers among top managers) on R&D output. The main contribution of this paper is to show that in areas with a higher QOG, greater R&D output for family firms depends on greater family control rather than family management. These findings give a better understanding of the interactive influence of inside and outside agency problems in family firms in general and their R&D output in particular across different cities, and may help both family firms’ leaders and government policy makers to foster innovation by controlling intrinsic and extrinsic agency problems.
Research limitations/implications
To date, most family firm innovation research has concentrated upon governance and R&D behaviour (Block, 2012; Brinkerink and Bammens, 2018; Chrisman and Patel, 2012; Lee and O’Neill, 2003). Few studies, however, have been performed from the major strategic (control) and operational (management) orientations, into the influence of outside (QOG) and inside (governance) factors upon innovation. This study attempts to fill that gap. It uses patent counts to measure the economic and technological importance of innovation. It argues that different QOG may lead major controllers or executives in family firms to have different motivations, and hence to approach innovation differently from the agency perspective.
Practical implications
The main contribution of this study is to show that in areas with a higher QOG, higher R&D outputs of family firms depend on higher family control rather than family management, due to the interactive influence of inside and outside agency problems. When family management is high, the direct effect is high, because family management may reduce the principal–agent agency cost (PAAC), but the interactive effect of QOG and family management is not significant. In areas with high QOG, although family management may reduce the PAAC, principal–principal and altruism agency costs may increase. Based on the twin agency theory, differing inside expropriation issues between strategic (family control) and operational (family management) orientations are the main differentiator, one accentuated by the external expropriation issues of QOG.
Social implications
These results contribute to a better understanding of family firms in general and their R&D output in particular across different cities. The findings also show of interest for government policy makers who should be aware of the significance of FFs’ characteristics for innovation and their incentives to conduct R&D projects.
Originality/value
The research uses Stulz’s (2005) “Twin agency” concept to analyse the interacting effects of state-level agency problems of governments with firm-level agency problems of family firms on R&D output. This paper answers the main question: What are the interactive effects of QOG and family firm governance on R&D output? The main contribution of the paper is to bridging the current gap in the literature.
期刊介绍:
Cross Cultural & Strategic Management (CCSM), is dedicated to providing a forum for the publication of high quality cross-cultural and strategic management research in the global context. CCSM is interdisciplinary in nature and welcomes submissions from scholars from international business, management and other disciplines, such as anthropology, economics, political science, psychology and sociology. The goal of CCSM is to publish discerning, theoretically grounded, evidence-based and cutting edge research on issues relevant to all aspects of global management. CCSM is especially interested in theoretical and empirical papers that investigate new and unique ideas and/or are multilevel (micro-meso-macro) and/or are multidisciplinary in nature. Research papers submitted to CCSM are expected to include an answer to the question: What is the contribution of this paper to the literature and the field of international business and managing in the global context? CCSM accepts theoretical/conceptual and empirical papers based on quantitative and qualitative research endeavors that advance our overall knowledge of international business. This includes research that yields positive, neutral or negative findings as long as these studies are based on sound research methodology, and have a good command of the theory/literature that pertains to the phenomena under investigation. These studies should also provide a more in-depth interpretation of the reason(s) for the findings and include more detailed recommendations for future research directions.