Cross-listing and noncompliance with the mandatory CSR expenditure regulation

PurposeIn this paper, the authors examine the relation between cross-listing and the noncompliance with the mandatory corporate social responsibility (CSR) expenditure regulation in India, the first country to legally mandate the CSR expenditure.Design/methodology/approachThe authors apply panel logit and ordinary least square (OLS) regression models to examine the impact of cross-listing on the noncompliance with the mandatory CSR expenditure regulation because panel regression has lesser multicollinearity problems and has the benefit of controlling for individual or time heterogeneity mostly present in cross-section or time series data.FindingsUsing a sample of 1,027 listed Indian firms, the authors show that the cross-listed firms are more likely to comply with the mandatory CSR expenditure than non-cross-listed firms. The authors further show that this relation holds only for those firms which are exposed to higher agency problems, for firms affiliated to business groups and for firms operating in high litigation risk industries. Finally, the authors show that cross-listed firms complying with the mandatory CSR expenditure command more valuation premiums.Practical implicationsThis study’s results suggest that the noncompliance of the Indian firms with the mandatory CSR expenditure regulation comes down once they cross-list their shares in the US or the UK since such firms have to bond to the stronger corporate governance standards of the listed country. Hence, the authors recommend that merely making the investment in CSR activities mandatory may not serve the purpose and the convergence in corporate governance as well as compliance with the CSR expenditure can be achieved through cross-listing in US and UK markets.Originality/valueOne, the authors analyze the effect of cross-listing on the likelihood and magnitude of noncompliance with the CSR mandate. Two, this study is based in India where CSR expenditure has been made mandatory under the Companies Act, 2013. Using CSR mandate as a natural experiment, the authors have access to a richer data set on CSR in terms of the actual expenditure made by the company on CSR activities and the mandatory amount to be spent in a particular year.