{"title":"对“风化腐败”复制的回应(法律与经济学杂志,2008):不同的数据产生不同的结果","authors":"P. Leeson, R. Sobel","doi":"10.1177/10911421211036247","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Cordis and Milyo replicate our study, which found a positive relationship between FEMA-provided disaster relief and public corruption in the US states. Our study used the corruption data that virtually every study of American corruption uses: PIN data. Using the same data, Cordis and Milyo find the same result. And using different corruption data from TRAC, they find a different result: no relationship between FEMA-provided disaster relief and public corruption. Unsurprisingly, different data produce different results. The meaning of that difference, however, is unclear, especially since the latter result, which implies that public actors do not respond rationally to incentives when making decisions regarding corrupt activities, contradicts the law of demand.","PeriodicalId":46919,"journal":{"name":"PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW","volume":"49 1","pages":"627 - 630"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2021-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Reply to a Replication of “Weathering Corruption” ( Journal of Law and Economics, 2008): Different Data Produce Different Results\",\"authors\":\"P. Leeson, R. Sobel\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/10911421211036247\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Cordis and Milyo replicate our study, which found a positive relationship between FEMA-provided disaster relief and public corruption in the US states. Our study used the corruption data that virtually every study of American corruption uses: PIN data. Using the same data, Cordis and Milyo find the same result. And using different corruption data from TRAC, they find a different result: no relationship between FEMA-provided disaster relief and public corruption. Unsurprisingly, different data produce different results. The meaning of that difference, however, is unclear, especially since the latter result, which implies that public actors do not respond rationally to incentives when making decisions regarding corrupt activities, contradicts the law of demand.\",\"PeriodicalId\":46919,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW\",\"volume\":\"49 1\",\"pages\":\"627 - 630\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-07-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/10911421211036247\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/10911421211036247","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
A Reply to a Replication of “Weathering Corruption” ( Journal of Law and Economics, 2008): Different Data Produce Different Results
Cordis and Milyo replicate our study, which found a positive relationship between FEMA-provided disaster relief and public corruption in the US states. Our study used the corruption data that virtually every study of American corruption uses: PIN data. Using the same data, Cordis and Milyo find the same result. And using different corruption data from TRAC, they find a different result: no relationship between FEMA-provided disaster relief and public corruption. Unsurprisingly, different data produce different results. The meaning of that difference, however, is unclear, especially since the latter result, which implies that public actors do not respond rationally to incentives when making decisions regarding corrupt activities, contradicts the law of demand.
期刊介绍:
Public Finance Review is a professional forum devoted to US policy-oriented economic research and theory, which focuses on a variety of allocation, distribution and stabilization functions within the public-sector economy. Economists, policy makers, political scientists, and researchers all rely on Public Finance Review, to bring them the most up-to-date information on the ever changing US public finance system, and to help them put policies and research into action. Public Finance Review not only presents rigorous empirical and theoretical papers on public economic policies, but also examines and critiques their impact and consequences. The journal analyzes the nature and function of evolving US governmental fiscal policies at the national, state and local levels.