内部治理与成本粘性

IF 1.4 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of Management Accounting Research Pub Date : 2022-11-23 DOI:10.2308/jmar-2020-043

Bo Zhang, Limei Yang, Ruixue Zhou

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引用次数: 2

摘要

内部治理是最高管理团队（以下简称“TMT”）内部自下而上的治理机制，主要下属通过该机制对首席执行官进行内部监督。我们发现，在控制了成本粘性的正当经济原因后，成本粘性与内部治理呈负相关，这表明内部治理减轻了基于代理的成本粘性。与机构的解释一致，结果表明，对于SG&A成本的未来价值创造较低的公司，内部治理对成本粘性的影响更强。此外，我们记录了内部治理对成本粘性的影响，对于董事会监督更有效的公司来说更为明显。本文扩展了越来越多的文献，这些文献调查了内部治理对公司决策的影响，并补充了现有的关于各种治理机制在减轻基于代理的成本粘性中的作用的研究。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Internal Governance and Cost Stickiness

Internal governance is the bottom-up governance mechanism within the top management team (hereinafter referred to as “TMT”) through which key subordinates internally monitor the CEO. We find that cost stickiness is negatively associated with internal governance after controlling for legitimate economic reasons of cost stickiness, suggesting that internal governance mitigates agency-based cost stickiness. Consistent with the agency explanation, the results show that the impact of internal governance on cost stickiness is stronger for firms with lower future value creation of SG&A costs. In addition, we document that the impact of internal governance on cost stickiness is more pronounced for ﬁrms with more effective board monitoring. This paper extends a growing literature that investigates the impact of internal governance on corporate decisions and complements existing studies on the role of various governance mechanisms in mitigating agency-based cost stickiness.

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来源期刊

Journal of Management Accounting Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

2.90

自引率

5.90%

发文量

期刊介绍： The mission of the Journal of Management Accounting Research (JMAR) is to advance the theory and practice of management accounting through publication of high-quality applied and theoretical research, using any well-executed research method. JMAR serves the global community of scholars and practitioners whose work impacts or is informed by the role that accounting information plays in decision-making and performance measurement within organizations. Settings may include profit and not-for profit organizations, service, retail and manufacturing organizations and domestic, foreign, and multinational firms. JMAR furthermore seeks to advance an understanding of management accounting in its broader context, such as issues related to the interface between internal and external reporting or taxation. New theories, topical areas, and research methods, as well as original research with novel implications to improve practice and disseminate the best managerial accounting practices are encouraged.