{"title":"元伦理学史再探——以艾尔的情感主义为例","authors":"Santiago-A. Vrech","doi":"10.15581/009.54.3.005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The aim of this paper is double. In the fi rst part I argue against the traditional interpretation of Ayer’s emotivism. According to this interpretation, in Language, Truth and Logic Ayer based emotivism on his “radical empiricist” (positivist) view. I argue that this is not so. Then, in the second part I develop a new interpretation of emotivism according to which Ayer’s analysis of moral vocabulary does not depend on positivism. The purpose of the article is to contribute to the history of metaethics by presenting a correct account of Ayer’s analysis.","PeriodicalId":42698,"journal":{"name":"Anuario Filosofico","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.1000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Revising the History of Meta-ethics: the Case of Ayer’s Emotivism\",\"authors\":\"Santiago-A. Vrech\",\"doi\":\"10.15581/009.54.3.005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The aim of this paper is double. In the fi rst part I argue against the traditional interpretation of Ayer’s emotivism. According to this interpretation, in Language, Truth and Logic Ayer based emotivism on his “radical empiricist” (positivist) view. I argue that this is not so. Then, in the second part I develop a new interpretation of emotivism according to which Ayer’s analysis of moral vocabulary does not depend on positivism. The purpose of the article is to contribute to the history of metaethics by presenting a correct account of Ayer’s analysis.\",\"PeriodicalId\":42698,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Anuario Filosofico\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Anuario Filosofico\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.15581/009.54.3.005\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Anuario Filosofico","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.15581/009.54.3.005","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Revising the History of Meta-ethics: the Case of Ayer’s Emotivism
The aim of this paper is double. In the fi rst part I argue against the traditional interpretation of Ayer’s emotivism. According to this interpretation, in Language, Truth and Logic Ayer based emotivism on his “radical empiricist” (positivist) view. I argue that this is not so. Then, in the second part I develop a new interpretation of emotivism according to which Ayer’s analysis of moral vocabulary does not depend on positivism. The purpose of the article is to contribute to the history of metaethics by presenting a correct account of Ayer’s analysis.
期刊介绍:
Anuario Filosófico, first published in 1968, is one of the most influential philosophical journals in the Spanish-speaking world. Since its beginning, it has published the work of a significant number of both Spanish and foreign philosophers, including Jan A. Aertsen, Elizabeth Anscombe, Werner Beierwaltes, Michael Dummett, Peter Geach, Susan Haack, Friedrich Kaulbach, Ralph McInerny, Antonio Millán-Puelles, Giovanni Reale and Robert Spaemann.