责任与不服从:特朗普时代良心与顺从的冲突

Keith A. Petty
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引用次数: 1

摘要

在一个永久战争的时代,服役人员被要求服从命令,并承担重大的法律和道德后果。然而,几起备受瞩目的案件对士兵的职责范围提出了质疑。2006年,Ehren Watada中尉拒绝被派往伊拉克,因为法律和道德上反对潜在的冲突。最近,内森·史密斯上尉在联邦法院起诉奥巴马总统,声称与伊斯兰国恐怖组织的冲突没有得到国会的适当授权。自2016年初以来,当时的共和党总统候选人唐纳德·特朗普多次提出以平民为目标和实施酷刑的方式打击恐怖主义的建议。如果面对这样的命令,在什么情况下服役人员有义务不服从?本文考察了服役人员的义务,重点关注了和田中尉、史密斯上尉和其他像他们一样,基于法律和道德理由反对特定武装冲突的人。具体来说,本文试图回答国家对战时法和战时法的遵守是否是士兵服从命令的先决条件。对这些问题的初步研究表明,在武装冲突期间,士兵有法律义务不服从非法命令(例如,针对平民、酷刑),但没有相应的法律义务不服从部署命令,以支持一场从士兵的角度来看是非法的战争。政府也对避免广泛的不服从感兴趣。一种行为研究方法表明,通过规范的内化、建设性异议的机会和更严格地遵守战争法,可以最好地实现顺从。这篇文章将吸引国家安全从业人员、决策者和学者。通过寻求方法使士兵更服从并就武装冲突作出更谨慎的战略一级决定,可以明显看出这与国家安全的关系。更广泛地说,合规理论对个人行为的检验适用于多学科和任何大型组织。当美国正在进行一场被一些人描述为“永远的战争”时,对士兵的服从进行审查尤为及时。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Duty and Disobedience: The Conflict of Conscience and Compliance in the Trump Era
In an era of perpetual war, service members are required to follow orders with significant legal and moral consequences. Several high-profile cases, however, call into question the limits of the soldier’s duty. In 2006, First Lieutenant Ehren Watada refused to deploy to Iraq because of legal and moral objections to the underlying conflict. More recently, Captain Nathan Smith sued President Obama in federal court, claiming the conflict against the Islamic State terrorist organization was not properly authorized by Congress. Since early 2016, then Republican Presidential candidate Donald Trump made multiple proposals to combat terrorism by targeting civilians and committing torture. If confronted with such orders, under what circumstances do service members have a duty to disobey? This article examines the obligations of service members, focusing on Lieutenant Watada, Captain Smith, and others like them who objected to specific armed conflicts on legal and moral grounds. Specifically, this article seeks to answer whether state adherence to the jus ad bellum and jus in bello is condition precedent for soldiers’ obedience to orders. A preliminary examination of these issues reveals that soldiers have a legal obligation to disobey unlawful orders during armed conflict (e.g., targeting civilians, torture), but there is no equivalent legal obligation to disobey orders to deploy in support of a war that is—from the soldier’s perspective — unlawful. The state is also interested in avoiding widespread disobedience. A behavioral studies approach suggests that compliance can best be achieved through internalization of norms, opportunities for constructive dissent, and stricter adherence to the jus ad bellum. This article will appeal to national security practitioners, decision makers, and scholars. The relevance to national security is evident by seeking methods to gain greater compliance from soldiers and more prudent strategic level decisions regarding armed conflict. More broadly, the examination of compliance theory to individual behavior is applicable to multiple disciplines and any large organization. The examination of the soldier’s obedience is particularly timely when the United States is engaged in what some describe as a "forever war."
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