高波动性关键和战略材料的供应合同及其对供应链的影响

IF 1 4区经济学 Q4 BUSINESS

Engineering Economist Pub Date : 2020-01-20 DOI:10.1080/0013791x.2020.1712508

K. Min, L. Lilienkamp, J. Jackman, C. Wang

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引用次数: 3

摘要

摘要对于稀土元素或原油等关键和战略性材料，我们研究了一个供应链，该供应链由一个面对高度波动的市场的中间商/生产商和一个在不同地区受固定期限供应合同约束的当地供应商组成。将签订合同的机会视为实物期权，构建了供给合同模型，并从中介/生产者的角度解析得出了最优的合同签订门槛价格。基于这个阈值，我们展示了阈值价格、交货时间和合同持续时间之间的关系如何导致供应链对交货时间长度的偏好分类，以及使用交货时间和合同持续时间作为供应链合同的可交易谈判工具的具体指导方针。

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Supply contracts for critical and strategic materials of high volatility and their ramifications for supply chains

Abstract For critical and strategic materials such as a rare earth element or crude oil, we study a supply chain consisting of an intermediary/producer facing a highly volatile market to its customers and a local supplier at a different region subject to a fixed term supply contract. By viewing the opportunity to sign this contract as a real option, we construct a supply contract model and analytically derive the optimal contract-signing threshold price from the intermediary/producer perspective. Based on this threshold, we show how the relationship among the threshold price, lead time, and contract duration results in a classification of the supply chain’s preferences for lead time length, and to concrete guidelines for using the lead time and contract duration as tradable negotiation tools for supply chain contracts.

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来源期刊

Engineering Economist ENGINEERING, INDUSTRIAL-OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

CiteScore

2.00

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

>12 weeks

期刊介绍： The Engineering Economist is a refereed journal published jointly by the Engineering Economy Division of the American Society of Engineering Education (ASEE) and the Institute of Industrial and Systems Engineers (IISE). The journal publishes articles, case studies, surveys, and book and software reviews that represent original research, current practice, and teaching involving problems of capital investment. The journal seeks submissions in a number of areas, including, but not limited to: capital investment analysis, financial risk management, cost estimation and accounting, cost of capital, design economics, economic decision analysis, engineering economy education, research and development, and the analysis of public policy when it is relevant to the economic investment decisions made by engineers and technology managers.