精英制度中的政治变革和行政更替

IF 4.5 1区社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE

West European Politics Pub Date : 2022-12-01 DOI:10.1080/01402382.2022.2148195

Jostein Askim, Tobias Bach, J. Christensen

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引用次数: 2

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Political change and administrative turnover in meritocratic systems

Abstract A change of government or minister constitutes a stress test for the relationship between ministers and bureaucrats. The new political masters may question the loyalty of incumbent bureaucrats and seek to replace them. However, the relationship between political changes and administrative turnover is poorly understood in meritocratic systems. This article analyses how changes of either government or minister affect the turnover of permanent secretaries in Denmark and Norway (1970–2020). Whereas ministers are completely reliant on career bureaucrats in pure meritocratic systems, they are supported by political appointees in hybrid meritocratic systems. The article investigates whether the effect of political changes on administrative turnover is mediated by the presence or absence of political appointees. Changes of government increase the risk of administrative turnover in Norway (hybrid system), but there are no such effects in Denmark (pure system), suggesting that political appointees potentially undermine the permanence of career bureaucrats.

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来源期刊

West European Politics POLITICAL SCIENCE-

CiteScore

10.00

自引率

7.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： West European Politics (WEP)has established itself as one of the most authoritative journals covering political and social issues in Western Europe. It has a substantial reviews section and coverage of all national elections in Western Europe. Its comprehensive scope, embracing all the major political and social developments in all West European countries, including the European Union, makes it essential reading for both political practitioners and academics.