Recognising personhood: the evolving relationship between the legal person and the state

The twenty-first century has already been characterised by substantive shifts in theory and law on legal personhood. There have been profound legal commitments to the full personhood of disabled people, dramatic new applications of personhood to natural entities such as rivers, and ongoing debates on the legal personhood of animals, artificial intelligence, and corporations and their public interest responsibilities. These shifts present an opportunity to re-examine our understanding of legal personhood. We may be able to move away from the white, European, able-bodied, cis-gender male approach to legal personhood that has dominated much of the world. This dominant approach was developed throughout the last several centuries and has largely met the needs of feudal lords, slave owners, colonial settlers, husbands, capitalists, and others that have held positions of social privilege and had the power and freedom to influence the development of theory and law. In line with the interests of these groups, the approach to legal personhood that has developed is largely in line with liberal political values that prioritise individualism and often ignores the relational nature of our socio-legal world. It emphasises the role of the state as one of non-interference with the freedom of the individual. However, this definition assumes that the individual has the power and privilege necessary to move deftly through the socio-legal world to secure their rights and interests. It disadvantages most groups and individuals that are not experiencing high levels of power and privilege and doesn’t recognise the inherent interdependence that we all live within and benefit from. In describing her concern related to this dominant conception of personhood, Ngaire Naffine stated: