请真正的物质主义者站出来好吗?

IF 0.9 3区 社会学 Q3 ANTHROPOLOGY
Christopher L. Witmore
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引用次数: 1

摘要

正如我们从戈维尔和斯蒂尔那里学到的那样,新唯物主义与读者在《考古学与新唯物主义》(以下简称“ArchaNeMs”)一文中发现的东西几乎相似。如果人们仍然相信简·贝内特充满活力的物质主义风格的本体论,或者正如作者所倡导的那样,凯伦·巴拉德的代理现实主义是唯一值得贴上这个标签的物质主义(Cipolla,2018:66n2;戈维尔,2019;哈里斯和西波拉,2017:191n74),那么他们在这一断言中没有错。正如戈维尔和斯蒂尔所建议的那样,这些物质主义有很多值得考古学家思考的地方。Bennett和Barad令人信服和复杂的本体论令人钦佩地告别了将物质世界描绘成“人类行动的顽固背景”的三心二意(Bennett,2010:111),并打破了被动、惰性物质和主动、创造性人类思维的公然二元论。然而,通过订阅一个穿越一种物质能量的不断颤动的物质配置的异质世界(Bennett,2010)或植根于表演性内在活动现象的动态关系本体论(Barad,2007),这种本体论吸引了一种简化的存在层次,几乎没有给事物作为自主实体留下空间。正是在寻求这些新唯物主义的替代方案中,ArchaNeMs才得以书写。对巴拉德来说,自主物体只是被不断流动的关系所包裹的转瞬即逝的物化(2007:150)。因此,事物被视为仅仅是衍生物而不予理会。这一哲学信条导致戈维尔和斯蒂尔在他们的文章中花了很大一部分时间来揭穿事物,即ArchaNeMs的基石,理由是他们是新唯物主义标题的非法伪装者。事实上,通过将事物定义为二阶实体,作者能够敷衍了事地将被毁的渡槽或废弃的鲱鱼工厂大规模地纳入巴拉德对“事物化”的批判中,在这种批判中,这些事物“不是预先存在的”,而是“代理人制定的”(同上),正是反对这种默认的分类学倾向,ArchaNeMs才赋予废墟自治的尊严
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Will the real materialisms please step forward?
New Materialisms, as we learn from Govier and Steel, bear but a peripheral resemblance to what readers find in the article, Archaeology and the New Materialisms (henceforth “ArchaNeMs”). If one remains convinced that ontologies in the style of Jane Bennett’s vibrant materialism or, as the authors champion, Karen Barad’s agential realism are the only materialisms worthy of this label (Cipolla, 2018: 66n2; Govier, 2019; Harris and Cipolla, 2017: 191n74), then they are not mistaken in this assertion. As Govier and Steel suggest, there is much to these materialisms for archaeologists to contemplate. The compelling and sophisticated ontologies of Bennett and Barad admirably bid farewell to half-hearted renderings of the material world as “a recalcitrant context for human action” (Bennett, 2010: 111) and shatter the flagrant dualism of a passive, inert matter and an active, creative human mind. However, by subscribing to a heterogeneous world of ceaselessly quivering material configurations traversing one matter-energy (Bennett, 2010) or a dynamic relational ontology rooted in performatively intra-active phenomena (Barad, 2007), such ontologies appeal to a reductive hierarchy of existence that leaves little room for things as autonomous entities. It was in seeking an alternative to these New Materialisms that ArchaNeMs was written. For Barad, autonomous objects are but evanescent materializations caught up in an unceasing flow of relations (2007: 150). Things, therefore, are dismissed as merely derivative. This philosophical precept leads Govier and Steel to dedicate a large portion of their article to debunking things, the building blocks for ArchaNeMs, on the grounds that they are illegitimate pretenders to the title of New Materialisms. Indeed, by framing things as second-order entities the authors are, as a perfunctory matter, able to maneuver ruined aqueducts or abandoned herring factories wholesale into Barad’s critique of “thingification,” where such things “do not preexist,” but are “agentially enacted” (Ibid.). Yet, it is against such default taxonomic tendencies that ArchaNeMs grants such ruins dignity as autonomous
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
30
期刊介绍: The Journal of Material Culture is an interdisciplinary journal designed to cater for the increasing interest in material culture studies. It is concerned with the relationship between artefacts and social relations irrespective of time and place and aims to systematically explore the linkage between the construction of social identities and the production and use of culture. The Journal of Material Culture transcends traditional disciplinary and cultural boundaries drawing on a wide range of disciplines including anthropology, archaeology, design studies, history, human geography, museology and ethnography.
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