民族文化所反映的风险承受能力如何影响薪酬绩效敏感性?

IF 0.9 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Journal of International Accounting Research Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI:10.2308/jiar-2021-039

Michael D. Free, P. Kent, Xin Qu, D. Yao

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引用次数: 0

摘要

标准委托代理模型预测，在其他条件不变的情况下，企业风险与CEO激励或薪酬绩效敏感性之间存在负相关关系。我们利用来自29个国家的国际数据，研究了CEO的风险承受能力(由国家文化决定)如何影响薪酬绩效敏感性。我们发现，来自风险承受能力高(低)国家的ceo与薪酬绩效敏感性高(低)相关，这表明他们需要低(高)风险溢价。我们通过将CEO风险承受能力这一被忽视的因素引入CEO薪酬合同，为CEO薪酬文献做出贡献。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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How Does Risk Tolerance Reflected in National Culture Affect Pay-Performance Sensitivity?

The standard principal-agent model predicts that, ceteris paribus, a negative relation exists between firm risk and CEO incentives or pay-performance sensitivity. We examine how a CEO’s risk tolerance (captured by national culture) affects pay-performance sensitivity using international data from 29 countries. We find that CEOs from countries with high (low) risk tolerance are associated with high (low) pay-performance sensitivity, suggesting that they require a low (high) risk premium. We contribute to the CEO compensation literature by introducing CEO risk tolerance, an overlooked factor, into CEO compensation contracts.

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来源期刊

Journal of International Accounting Research BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

16.70%

发文量