{"title":"从非自由的姿态到反自由的他者:土耳其宪法法院的组成和法理变化","authors":"Serkan Yolcu, Barış Bahçeci","doi":"10.54648/euro2022012","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article reveals the change in the Turkish Constitutional Court’s (TCC/Court) jurisprudence due to the transformation in its structure. We develop our arguments on the assumption that the Court’s ideological attitude is determined according to interaction with political actors and argue that from 1980 onwards, two facts were determinant: (1) the role of the constitutional amendment in 2010 in relation to court-packing aim and (2) the role of President of Turkish Republic due to his appointment power. To this end, we examine the changing ideological line of the TCC by focusing on selected rulings delivered during Court’s two eras divided by 2010 constitutional amendments. We argue that the TCC dramatically changed direction from liberal towards anti-liberal line in its decisions and structure. Before 2010, members who did not act in line with the president who appointed them and did not have a sharp ideological stance were encountered. This situation was reflected in the voting behaviour of the members and brought ambivalent attitudes. After 2010, this situation was reversed and especially as of 2017, some members became loyal to the president, and it was seen that the court acted with a sharper division in critical decisions and transform into an anti-liberal stance in its jurisprudence.\nconstitutional review, Turkish Constitutional Court, judicial behaviour, constitutional judges, decision-making in constitutional courts","PeriodicalId":43955,"journal":{"name":"European Public Law","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"From an Illiberal Posture to an Anti-liberal Other: The Changing Composition and Jurisprudence of the Turkish Constitutional Court\",\"authors\":\"Serkan Yolcu, Barış Bahçeci\",\"doi\":\"10.54648/euro2022012\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This article reveals the change in the Turkish Constitutional Court’s (TCC/Court) jurisprudence due to the transformation in its structure. We develop our arguments on the assumption that the Court’s ideological attitude is determined according to interaction with political actors and argue that from 1980 onwards, two facts were determinant: (1) the role of the constitutional amendment in 2010 in relation to court-packing aim and (2) the role of President of Turkish Republic due to his appointment power. To this end, we examine the changing ideological line of the TCC by focusing on selected rulings delivered during Court’s two eras divided by 2010 constitutional amendments. We argue that the TCC dramatically changed direction from liberal towards anti-liberal line in its decisions and structure. Before 2010, members who did not act in line with the president who appointed them and did not have a sharp ideological stance were encountered. This situation was reflected in the voting behaviour of the members and brought ambivalent attitudes. After 2010, this situation was reversed and especially as of 2017, some members became loyal to the president, and it was seen that the court acted with a sharper division in critical decisions and transform into an anti-liberal stance in its jurisprudence.\\nconstitutional review, Turkish Constitutional Court, judicial behaviour, constitutional judges, decision-making in constitutional courts\",\"PeriodicalId\":43955,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Public Law\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-05-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Public Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2022012\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"LAW\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Public Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.54648/euro2022012","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
From an Illiberal Posture to an Anti-liberal Other: The Changing Composition and Jurisprudence of the Turkish Constitutional Court
This article reveals the change in the Turkish Constitutional Court’s (TCC/Court) jurisprudence due to the transformation in its structure. We develop our arguments on the assumption that the Court’s ideological attitude is determined according to interaction with political actors and argue that from 1980 onwards, two facts were determinant: (1) the role of the constitutional amendment in 2010 in relation to court-packing aim and (2) the role of President of Turkish Republic due to his appointment power. To this end, we examine the changing ideological line of the TCC by focusing on selected rulings delivered during Court’s two eras divided by 2010 constitutional amendments. We argue that the TCC dramatically changed direction from liberal towards anti-liberal line in its decisions and structure. Before 2010, members who did not act in line with the president who appointed them and did not have a sharp ideological stance were encountered. This situation was reflected in the voting behaviour of the members and brought ambivalent attitudes. After 2010, this situation was reversed and especially as of 2017, some members became loyal to the president, and it was seen that the court acted with a sharper division in critical decisions and transform into an anti-liberal stance in its jurisprudence.
constitutional review, Turkish Constitutional Court, judicial behaviour, constitutional judges, decision-making in constitutional courts