在法律之外治理民主:印度选举委员会和问责制的挑战

Q3 Social Sciences
M. A. Bhat
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引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要比较法律和政治文献广泛承认选举管理机构在确保宪政民主国家福祉方面的作用。学者们注意到,这些机构的独立性和问责制在政治上是可取的。但在这两种价值观之间取得平衡说起来容易做起来难。这篇文章通过关注印度选举委员会(ECI)作为强大EMB的典范版本,强调了问责制的困境。印度政治学者长期以来一直注意到,在过去几十年里,该机构的权力不断扩大,往往超出了最初的宪法意图或议会立法。他们认为,这削弱了其机构问责制。这篇文章对ECI的广泛职能以及随之而来的担忧采取了新的视角。它认为,选举法委员会不是通过我们通常认为的法律来监管选举过程。其最引人注目和最重要的职能是通过法外监管模式。根据最近关于监管的学术研究,该文章认为,选举委员会通过非法律形式的架构、推动和基于通知的监管来塑造选举环境和行为。与部署它们的其他领域非常相似,这些法外模式在透明度方面表现出独特的内在局限性。因此,正是ECI职能的这一特点——而不仅仅是其不断扩大的广度——对民主问责制构成了最重大的挑战。基于这一评估,文章指出,对于像信保局这样强大的教统局来说,持续运作问责制形式的问责制在本质上是有限的。这通过其他方式,特别是通过确保这些机构的章程、组成和任期,增加了这些机构问责制的风险。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Governing Democracy Outside the Law: India's Election Commission and the Challenge of Accountability
Abstract Comparative law and politics literature widely recognizes the role of election management bodies (EMBs) in securing the well-being of constitutional democracies. Scholars have noted the political desirability of both independence and accountability of these institutions. But striking balance between these two values is easier said than done. This Article highlights the dilemma of accountability by focusing on India's Election Commission (ECI) as a paradigmatic version of a powerful EMB. Scholars of Indian politics have long noted the institution's widening powers – often beyond the original constitutional intent or parliamentary legislation – over the last few decades. This, they argue, has impaired its institutional accountability. This Article adopts a fresh perspective on the ECI's expansive functions, and the attendant concerns these raise. It argues that the ECI regulates the electoral process not through what we may ordinarily identify as the law. The most compelling and consequential of its functions are through extra-legal modalities of regulation. Drawing from recent scholarship on regulation, the Article argues that the ECI shapes the electoral environment and behaviour through non-legal modalities of architecture, nudge and notice-based regulations. Much like the other fields where they are deployed, these extra-legal modalities exhibit unique, and in many ways, inherent limitations with respect to transparency. It is thus this character of the ECI's functions – rather than only their widening breadth – that poses the most significant challenge for democratic accountability. Based on this assessment, the Article notes that for powerful EMBs like the ECI, accountability in the form of on-going operational accountability is inherently limited in compelling ways. This increases the stakes for accountability of these institutions through other means, particularly by securing their constitution, composition and tenure.
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来源期刊
Asian Journal of Comparative Law
Asian Journal of Comparative Law Social Sciences-Law
CiteScore
1.00
自引率
0.00%
发文量
24
期刊介绍: The Asian Journal of Comparative Law (AsJCL) is the leading forum for research and discussion of the law and legal systems of Asia. It embraces work that is theoretical, empirical, socio-legal, doctrinal or comparative that relates to one or more Asian legal systems, as well as work that compares one or more Asian legal systems with non-Asian systems. The Journal seeks articles which display an intimate knowledge of Asian legal systems, and thus provide a window into the way they work in practice. The AsJCL is an initiative of the Asian Law Institute (ASLI), an association established by thirteen leading law schools in Asia and with a rapidly expanding membership base across Asia and in other regions around the world.
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