可再生能源上网电价与拍卖的作用:中国与全球经验

IF 3.7 Q1 ECONOMICS
D. Roberts
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引用次数: 3

摘要

近年来,全球非水力可再生能源装机容量急剧增长,从2010年到2018年增长了约3倍。中国的增长更为剧烈,同期增长了约8.8倍。此外,几乎所有的增长都是以风能和太阳能的形式出现的。当各国政府决定刺激可再生能源产能的大幅增长时,选择的政策工具是非竞争性分配管理上网电价。通过使用这一工具补贴新产能的决定反映了快速刺激缺乏经验和硬数据的新行业发展的愿望。对许多国家来说,随着可再生能源产能的快速扩张和传统化石燃料价格的下跌,与FiTs相关的补贴的绝对成本大幅增加。2014年,据估计,中国每年的可再生能源补贴约为140亿元。随后,它们在2018年增长了约10倍,达到约1400亿元,据彭博新能源财经估计,2019年总计近2300亿元。中国可再生能源补贴的这种水平和趋势可以说在财政上是站不住脚的,在经济上也是不必要的。与可再生能源产能的大幅增长相关的是风能和太阳能生产成本的大幅降低。在2009-2019年期间,太阳能光伏发电的全球平均平准化电力成本下降了81%,陆上风电下降了46%,海上风电下降了45%。政策制定者越来越多地选择通过竞争性拍卖程序设定FiT。这样做的主要原因是:(a)减轻政府的补贴负担;(b) 促进将较低的生产成本转移给消费者;(c) 减少对新产能过度投资的动机;以及(d)避免与项目开发商利润过高有关的股权问题。在过去十年中,全球拍卖的可再生能源发电量呈指数级增长,从2012年的3吉瓦上升到2017年的52吉瓦。然而,拍卖现在才开始大规模部署。就在2018年,它们在任何一年中对全球可再生能源产能的贡献都不到10%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Feed-in tariffs for renewable power and the role of auctions: the Chinese & global experience
Global installed capacity of non-hydro renewable energy has grown dramatically in recent years, with an increase of ~3x from 2010 to 2018. The increase in China has been even more dramatic, with a ~ 8.8x rise over the same period. Furthermore, almost all of the increase has been in the form of wind and solar power. When governments decided to stimulate the massive increase in renewable energy capacity, the policy tool of choice was the non-competitive allocation of administered feed-in tariffs (FITs). The decision to subsidize new capacity through the use of this tool reflected the desire to quickly spur the development of a new industry which lacked experience and hard data. For many countries, the absolute cost of the subsidy associated with FiTs has increased significantly with the rapid expansion of renewable energy capacity and depressed prices for conventional fossil fuel. In 2014, it is estimated that China’s annual renewable energy subsidies were ~14 billion Yuan. They subsequently increased by roughly 10x to ~140 billion Yuan in 2018, and are estimated by Bloomberg New Energy Finance to have totaled almost 230 billion Yuan in 2019. This level and trend in renewable energy subsidies in China is arguably both fiscally untenable and economically unnecessary. Related to the dramatic increase in renewable energy capacity is a dramatic reduction in the cost of producing wind and solar power. Over the 2009–2019 period the global average Levelized Cost of Electricity fell 81% for solar PV, 46% for on-shore wind, and 45% for offshore wind. Policymakers are increasingly choosing to set FiTs through a competitive auction process. The key reasons for doing this are: (a) to reduce the subsidy burden on governments; (b) to facilitate the transfer of lower production costs to consumers; (c) to reduce the incentive to overinvest in new capacity; and (d) to avoid equity concerns associated with excessive profits for project developers. Over the past decade, there has been exponential growth in global auctioned renewable power capacity – rising from 3 GW in 2012 to 52 GW in 2017. However, auctions are only now starting to be deployed on a wide scale. As recently as 2018, they contributed to less than 10% of the global renewable energy capacity in any one year.
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CiteScore
5.60
自引率
3.00%
发文量
20
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