社交网络和管理层寻租:来自高管交易盈利能力的证据

IF 2.1 3区经济学 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE

European Financial Management Pub Date : 2023-05-18 DOI:10.1111/eufm.12429

Xiaohua Fang, Xi Rao, Wenjun Zhang

{"title":"社交网络和管理层寻租:来自高管交易盈利能力的证据","authors":"Xiaohua Fang, Xi Rao, Wenjun Zhang","doi":"10.1111/eufm.12429","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines whether board social networks are associated with executive trading profitability. Using a sample of US public firms with a history of executive trading from years 2000 to 2015, we find robust evidence that the profitability of executive trading is significantly lower in firms with higher levels of board social networks. The evidence is consistent with our view that board social networks effectively curb executives' private information advantage over outsiders, thus leading to a lower level of managerial rent-seeking. Our research has policy implications for regulators concerned about the role of corporate board in capital markets.</p>","PeriodicalId":47815,"journal":{"name":"European Financial Management","volume":"30 1","pages":"602-633"},"PeriodicalIF":2.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Social networks and managerial rent-seeking: Evidence from executive trading profitability\",\"authors\":\"Xiaohua Fang, Xi Rao, Wenjun Zhang\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/eufm.12429\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>This study examines whether board social networks are associated with executive trading profitability. Using a sample of US public firms with a history of executive trading from years 2000 to 2015, we find robust evidence that the profitability of executive trading is significantly lower in firms with higher levels of board social networks. The evidence is consistent with our view that board social networks effectively curb executives' private information advantage over outsiders, thus leading to a lower level of managerial rent-seeking. Our research has policy implications for regulators concerned about the role of corporate board in capital markets.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":47815,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Financial Management\",\"volume\":\"30 1\",\"pages\":\"602-633\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-05-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Financial Management\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/eufm.12429\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Financial Management","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/eufm.12429","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

本研究探讨了董事会社交网络是否与高管交易盈利能力相关。通过对 2000 年至 2015 年期间有高管交易历史的美国上市公司进行抽样调查，我们发现了强有力的证据，表明董事会社交网络水平较高的公司高管交易的盈利能力显著较低。这些证据与我们的观点一致，即董事会社交网络能有效抑制高管相对于外部人的私人信息优势，从而降低管理寻租水平。我们的研究对关注公司董事会在资本市场中作用的监管者具有政策意义。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

Social networks and managerial rent-seeking: Evidence from executive trading profitability

This study examines whether board social networks are associated with executive trading profitability. Using a sample of US public firms with a history of executive trading from years 2000 to 2015, we find robust evidence that the profitability of executive trading is significantly lower in firms with higher levels of board social networks. The evidence is consistent with our view that board social networks effectively curb executives' private information advantage over outsiders, thus leading to a lower level of managerial rent-seeking. Our research has policy implications for regulators concerned about the role of corporate board in capital markets.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

European Financial Management BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

4.30

自引率

18.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： European Financial Management publishes the best research from around the world, providing a forum for both academics and practitioners concerned with the financial management of modern corporation and financial institutions. The journal publishes signficant new finance research on timely issues and highlights key trends in Europe in a clear and accessible way, with articles covering international research and practice that have direct or indirect bearing on Europe.