大学拨款公式:对改革与激励机制的分析

IF 1 Q3 EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH
Pierre St-Amant, Alexis-Nicolas Brabant, É. Germain
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引用次数: 3

摘要

本文分析了一个主要基于入学率的大学资助公式所带来的激励。使用一个简单的博弈论框架,我们认为这些公式本质上降低了每个学生的资助。我们认为,如果资助价值因入学类型而异,它会引入激励机制,在最有利可图的地方替代入学。我们使用这些结果来讨论2018年quacimac的资助公式变化。quacimbec的最新改革是为了减少替代效应,增加研究生入学率。我们对改革的再分配效应进行了模拟。随着公式的改变,一些大学比其他大学具有结构性优势。虽然改革在短期内部署了一种机制来缓解这些优势,但从长期来看,改革的效果在quimac和高等教育机构之间造成了更大的差距。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
University Funding Formulas: An Analysis of the Québec Reforms and Incentives
This paper analyzes the incentives induced by a formula to fund universities based primarily on enrolment. Using a simple game theoretical framework, we argue that inherently those formulas lower the funding per student. We argue that if the funding value differs by enrolment type, it introduces incentives to substitute enrolment where most profitable. We use these results to discuss the 2018 funding formula changes in Québec. Québec’s latest reform is an attempt to reduce substitution effects and increase graduate enrolment. We provide simulations of the reform’s redistributive effects. With the formula change, some universities have structural advantages over others. Whilst the reform, on a short-term basis, deploys a mechanism to mitigate these advantages, on a long-term basis the effect introduces a larger gap between Québec higher-education institutions.
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来源期刊
Canadian Journal of Higher Education
Canadian Journal of Higher Education EDUCATION & EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH-
CiteScore
1.70
自引率
14.30%
发文量
30
审稿时长
44 weeks
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