{"title":"超级权和反对“总体应该”的案例","authors":"Elizabeth Ventham","doi":"10.2307/48570847","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\n This paper argues against a kind of “overall ought.” The main argument is a version of the paradox of supererogation. The problem is this: obligating an agent to do what’s overall best will, when that differs from what’s they morally ought to do, obligate the agent to not do what’s they morally ought to. This, the paper will argue, is implausible. For each of four possible interpretations of this overall ought concept, it will either come across a form of this paradox or no longer look like the targeted “overall ought” concept at all.","PeriodicalId":47459,"journal":{"name":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.8000,"publicationDate":"2020-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"SUPEREROGATION AND THE CASE AGAINST AN “OVERALL OUGHT”\",\"authors\":\"Elizabeth Ventham\",\"doi\":\"10.2307/48570847\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\n This paper argues against a kind of “overall ought.” The main argument is a version of the paradox of supererogation. The problem is this: obligating an agent to do what’s overall best will, when that differs from what’s they morally ought to do, obligate the agent to not do what’s they morally ought to. This, the paper will argue, is implausible. For each of four possible interpretations of this overall ought concept, it will either come across a form of this paradox or no longer look like the targeted “overall ought” concept at all.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47459,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-04-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2307/48570847\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"哲学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2307/48570847","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
SUPEREROGATION AND THE CASE AGAINST AN “OVERALL OUGHT”
This paper argues against a kind of “overall ought.” The main argument is a version of the paradox of supererogation. The problem is this: obligating an agent to do what’s overall best will, when that differs from what’s they morally ought to do, obligate the agent to not do what’s they morally ought to. This, the paper will argue, is implausible. For each of four possible interpretations of this overall ought concept, it will either come across a form of this paradox or no longer look like the targeted “overall ought” concept at all.
期刊介绍:
Since its inauguration in 1964, the American Philosophical Quarterly (APQ) has established itself as one of the principal English vehicles for the publication of scholarly work in philosophy. The whole of each issue—printed in a large-page, double-column format—is given to substantial articles; from time to time there are also "state of the art" surveys of recent work on particular topics. The editorial policy is to publish work of high quality, regardless of the school of thought from which it derives.