{"title":"导弹测试数据集介绍","authors":"Cem Birol","doi":"10.1080/10242694.2021.1990516","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This paper introduces the Missile Tests Dataset which consists of the publicized and undisclosed missile tests conducted by 15 countries that initiated their missile development programs sometime between 1946 and 2015. Then it statistically explores factors that affect how frequently these countries test-launch their missiles. In that regard, three broad possibilities are investigated: (i) increases in missile tests following decisions to upgrade the missile arsenal or missile-dependent technologies, (ii) increases in missile tests as a retaliation to foreign military threats, and (iii) decreases in missile tests due to economic costs introduced by sanctions. Negative Binomial regression analyses suggest that decisions to upgrade missile and missile-dependent technologies increase all missile tests but have no consistent effect on publicized missile tests. Threats of military nature have surprisingly no consistent effect on all or publicized missile tests. However, receiving economic sanctions increase publicized missile tests. The paper concludes with a discussion of future research possibilities, and policy recommendations.","PeriodicalId":47477,"journal":{"name":"Defence and Peace Economics","volume":"33 1","pages":"108 - 128"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Introducing Missile Tests Dataset\",\"authors\":\"Cem Birol\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/10242694.2021.1990516\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT This paper introduces the Missile Tests Dataset which consists of the publicized and undisclosed missile tests conducted by 15 countries that initiated their missile development programs sometime between 1946 and 2015. Then it statistically explores factors that affect how frequently these countries test-launch their missiles. In that regard, three broad possibilities are investigated: (i) increases in missile tests following decisions to upgrade the missile arsenal or missile-dependent technologies, (ii) increases in missile tests as a retaliation to foreign military threats, and (iii) decreases in missile tests due to economic costs introduced by sanctions. Negative Binomial regression analyses suggest that decisions to upgrade missile and missile-dependent technologies increase all missile tests but have no consistent effect on publicized missile tests. Threats of military nature have surprisingly no consistent effect on all or publicized missile tests. However, receiving economic sanctions increase publicized missile tests. The paper concludes with a discussion of future research possibilities, and policy recommendations.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47477,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Defence and Peace Economics\",\"volume\":\"33 1\",\"pages\":\"108 - 128\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-10-21\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Defence and Peace Economics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2021.1990516\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Defence and Peace Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2021.1990516","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT This paper introduces the Missile Tests Dataset which consists of the publicized and undisclosed missile tests conducted by 15 countries that initiated their missile development programs sometime between 1946 and 2015. Then it statistically explores factors that affect how frequently these countries test-launch their missiles. In that regard, three broad possibilities are investigated: (i) increases in missile tests following decisions to upgrade the missile arsenal or missile-dependent technologies, (ii) increases in missile tests as a retaliation to foreign military threats, and (iii) decreases in missile tests due to economic costs introduced by sanctions. Negative Binomial regression analyses suggest that decisions to upgrade missile and missile-dependent technologies increase all missile tests but have no consistent effect on publicized missile tests. Threats of military nature have surprisingly no consistent effect on all or publicized missile tests. However, receiving economic sanctions increase publicized missile tests. The paper concludes with a discussion of future research possibilities, and policy recommendations.
期刊介绍:
Defence and Peace Economics embraces all aspects of the economics of defence, disarmament, conversion and peace. Examples include the study of alliances and burden-sharing; military spending in developed and developing nations; arms races; terrorism; country surveys; the impact of disarmament on employment and unemployment; the prospects for conversion and the role of public policy in assisting the transition; the costs and benefits of arms control regimes; the arms trade; economic sanctions; the role of the United Nations.