The Uses and Misuses of Politics: Karl Rove and the Bush Presidency,

William G. Mayer is Professor of Political Science at Northeastern University, and the author of a number of well received books on American elections and parties. His latest book, The Uses and Misuses of Politics, examines the elections and domestic policies of George W. Bush, with particular emphasis on his relationship to his chief policy advisor, Karl Rove, who was also his campaign manager and domestic political advisor. The ambitions and self-assessment of the two men can be gathered from their own words. First, President Bush, in 2008: “Look, I know that this probably sounds arrogant to say, but I redefined the Republican Party.” Then Karl Rove: “Rove [suggested] that the electorate in 2000 ...was ripe for realignment and implied ... that he was the guy who had figured it out...” Joshua Green, “The Rove Presidency”, Atlantic, September 7, 2007. One notices the two large “R-words”: redefinition and realignment. Mayer conducts a careful and dispassionate analysis to determine the features of the redefinition or reorientation that Bush claimed as his achievement, and to judge whether it was achieved. Likewise, he demonstrates that, for Rove, remaking the GOP was the necessary first move in a strategic plan to produce an historical “Realignment,” comparable to those achieved by FDR, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and, according to Rove, William McKinley. Accordingly, Mayer examines theories of “Political Realignment,” as well as the evidence bearing on whether Rove and his boss had achieved one. What was to be the look of this new GOP? The simple description, and likely the best, is that it was supposed to appear “Nice.” The slogan “No Child Left Behind” (NCLB) was its perfect expression. This was to have been painted all over the GOP big tent, with the main acts still being national security, low taxes, smaller government, and sane Supreme Court appointments. The “Realignment” Rove aimed at would have made the GOP the dominant party in American politics for an extended period, perhaps decades. Mayer has little trouble in showing that Rove and his boss did not get close to it. There was no seismic shift toward the GOP, either right away, or up to the present day. The more interesting question is, “Why did this plan fail?” The book’s title indicates Mayer’s answer. Rove was at the same time the President’s chief advisor on domestic policy and on political matters, something without precedent in recent American government. Bush relied on Rove’s counsel in both areas, and Rove counseled unwisely in both. Moreover, he favored politics, which Mayer defines as “the art of acquiring and keeping power,” over the real work of administration. Rove, and Bush following him, produced mediocre policy, and at the same time undermined the power of their party. In all, this is quite an indictment by Mayer. Is he correct? A look at two instances that Mayer explores at some length, the aforementioned “No Child Left Behind” and “Compassionate Conservativism,” is useful in answering this question. The longest chapter in “Uses and Abuses” traces the history of Compassionate Conservativism from its inception in the 1990s all the way to its quiet death at the start of the Obama years. It is entitled, “It’s Hard to Have Ideological Heirs When You Don’t Have Much of an Ideology.” There can be no doubt that the idea of compassionate conservatism appealed to Bush. Nearly everyone who has met George Bush personally, calls him decent and amiable. Bush has what a critic might call a “soft heart.” A born-again Christian, Bush himself might prefer the Biblical language of “a heart of flesh.” In a 1999 campaign debate, in answer to the question “What political philosopher or thinker do you most identify with and why?,” Bush answered “Christ. Because He changed my heart.” No one has ever said Rove is “soft-hearted,” but he was completely on board with Compassionate Conservatism, at least as a sales pitch. Indeed, he https://doi.org/10.1080/10457097.2021.1951567