{"title":"为什么辱骂是错误的","authors":"Thaddeus Metz","doi":"10.6018/DAIMON.476391","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"espanolEste articulo busca proporcionar una descripcion completa y fundamental de por que los epitetos raciales y slurs similares son inmora-les, alla donde lo sean. Considera tres teorias prin-cipales, segun las cuales, a grandes rasgos, son inmorales porque son daninos (bienestarismo), porque socavan la autonomia (kantianismo) o porque son hostiles (un enfoque relacional poco discutido informado por ideas del Sur Glo-bal). Este articulo presenta nuevas objeciones a las dos primeras teorias y concluye a favor de la ultima justificacion. Se muestra que considerar que los slurs son inmorales en la medida en que son hostiles captura las ventajas de las otras teo-rias evitando sus desventajas. EnglishThis article seeks to provide a comprehensive and fundamental account of why racial epithets and similar slurs are immoral, whenever they are. It considers three major theories, roughly according to which they are immoral because they are harmful (welfarism), because they undermine autonomy (Kantianism), or because they are unfriendly (an under-considered, relational approach informed by ideas from the Global South). This article presents new objections to the former two theories, and concludes in favour of the latter rationale. Deeming slurs to be wrong insofar as they are unfriendly is shown to capture the advantages of the other theories, while avoiding their disadvantages.","PeriodicalId":0,"journal":{"name":"","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2021-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Exactly Why Are Slurs Wrong\",\"authors\":\"Thaddeus Metz\",\"doi\":\"10.6018/DAIMON.476391\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"espanolEste articulo busca proporcionar una descripcion completa y fundamental de por que los epitetos raciales y slurs similares son inmora-les, alla donde lo sean. Considera tres teorias prin-cipales, segun las cuales, a grandes rasgos, son inmorales porque son daninos (bienestarismo), porque socavan la autonomia (kantianismo) o porque son hostiles (un enfoque relacional poco discutido informado por ideas del Sur Glo-bal). Este articulo presenta nuevas objeciones a las dos primeras teorias y concluye a favor de la ultima justificacion. Se muestra que considerar que los slurs son inmorales en la medida en que son hostiles captura las ventajas de las otras teo-rias evitando sus desventajas. EnglishThis article seeks to provide a comprehensive and fundamental account of why racial epithets and similar slurs are immoral, whenever they are. It considers three major theories, roughly according to which they are immoral because they are harmful (welfarism), because they undermine autonomy (Kantianism), or because they are unfriendly (an under-considered, relational approach informed by ideas from the Global South). This article presents new objections to the former two theories, and concludes in favour of the latter rationale. Deeming slurs to be wrong insofar as they are unfriendly is shown to capture the advantages of the other theories, while avoiding their disadvantages.\",\"PeriodicalId\":0,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-09-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.6018/DAIMON.476391\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.6018/DAIMON.476391","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
espanolEste articulo busca proporcionar una descripcion completa y fundamental de por que los epitetos raciales y slurs similares son inmora-les, alla donde lo sean. Considera tres teorias prin-cipales, segun las cuales, a grandes rasgos, son inmorales porque son daninos (bienestarismo), porque socavan la autonomia (kantianismo) o porque son hostiles (un enfoque relacional poco discutido informado por ideas del Sur Glo-bal). Este articulo presenta nuevas objeciones a las dos primeras teorias y concluye a favor de la ultima justificacion. Se muestra que considerar que los slurs son inmorales en la medida en que son hostiles captura las ventajas de las otras teo-rias evitando sus desventajas. EnglishThis article seeks to provide a comprehensive and fundamental account of why racial epithets and similar slurs are immoral, whenever they are. It considers three major theories, roughly according to which they are immoral because they are harmful (welfarism), because they undermine autonomy (Kantianism), or because they are unfriendly (an under-considered, relational approach informed by ideas from the Global South). This article presents new objections to the former two theories, and concludes in favour of the latter rationale. Deeming slurs to be wrong insofar as they are unfriendly is shown to capture the advantages of the other theories, while avoiding their disadvantages.