互联网提供商之间的流量调度和收入分配:权衡和影响

IF 13.8 1区 计算机科学 Q1 ENGINEERING, ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC
Hyojung Lee, Hyeryung Jang, Jeong-woo Cho, Yung Yi
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引用次数: 9

摘要

在访问/传输连接和内容分发方面,互联网由经济上自私的参与者组成。这种自私的行为往往会导致技术经济效率低下,比如不稳定的对等和收入失衡。最近的研究结果表明,基于合作的公平收入分享,即多层次互联网服务提供商(ISP)结算,可以成为避免不公平收入分享的候选解决方案。然而,自私的ISP是否真的合作(通常被称为联盟的稳定性)还没有得到充分的探讨,因为他们可能部分合作,甚至不合作,这取决于每个ISP的收入分配情况。在本文中,我们研究了互联网联盟的这种稳定性,我们的目的是研究互联网服务提供商在不同制度下就流量需求和网络带宽进行合作的条件。我们首先考虑需求不足的制度,即网络带宽超过流量需求,基于Shapley价值的收入共享导致ISP完全合作,即大联盟的稳定性。接下来,我们考虑过度需求制度,即流量需求超过网络带宽,其中可能存在一些偏离大联盟的ISP。特别是,这种偏差取决于网络内部如何处理用户的流量,为此,我们考虑了三种具有不同程度内容价值偏好的流量调度策略。我们从网络中立性和合作稳定性的角度对这三种调度策略进行了分析比较,这对多层次ISP结算何时以及如何提供帮助以及如何运营互联网以实现ISP之间的稳定对等和收入平衡提供了有益的启示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Traffic Scheduling and Revenue Distribution Among Providers in the Internet: Tradeoffs and Impacts
The Internet consists of economically selfish players in terms of access/transit connection and content distribution. Such selfish behaviors often lead to techno-economic inefficiencies, such as unstable peering and revenue imbalance. Recent research results suggest that cooperation-based fair revenue sharing, i.e., multi-level Internet service provider (ISP) settlements, can be a candidate solution to avoid unfair revenue share. However, it has been under-explored whether selfish ISPs actually cooperate or not (often referred to as the stability of coalition), because they may partially cooperate or even do not cooperate, depending on how much revenue is distributed to each individual ISP. In this paper, we study this stability of coalition in the Internet, where our aim is to investigate the conditions under which ISPs cooperate under different regimes on the traffic demand and network bandwidth. We first consider the under-demanded regime, i.e., network bandwidth exceeds traffic demand, where revenue sharing based on Shapley value leads ISPs to entirely cooperate, i.e., stability of the grand coalition. Next, we consider the over-demanded regime, i.e., traffic demand exceeds network bandwidth, where there may exist some ISPs who deviate from the grand coalition. In particular, this deviation depends on how users’ traffic is handled inside the network, for which we consider three traffic scheduling policies having various degrees of content-value preference. We analytically compare those three scheduling policies in terms of network neutrality, and stability of cooperation that provides useful implications on when and how multi-level ISP settlements help and how the Internet should be operated for stable peering and revenue balance among ISPs.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
30.00
自引率
4.30%
发文量
234
审稿时长
6 months
期刊介绍: The IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (JSAC) is a prestigious journal that covers various topics related to Computer Networks and Communications (Q1) as well as Electrical and Electronic Engineering (Q1). Each issue of JSAC is dedicated to a specific technical topic, providing readers with an up-to-date collection of papers in that area. The journal is highly regarded within the research community and serves as a valuable reference. The topics covered by JSAC issues span the entire field of communications and networking, with recent issue themes including Network Coding for Wireless Communication Networks, Wireless and Pervasive Communications for Healthcare, Network Infrastructure Configuration, Broadband Access Networks: Architectures and Protocols, Body Area Networking: Technology and Applications, Underwater Wireless Communication Networks, Game Theory in Communication Systems, and Exploiting Limited Feedback in Tomorrow’s Communication Networks.
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