商业利益、保守经济学家和拉丁美洲非缴费养老金的扩大

IF 4.1 2区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
T. Dorlach
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引用次数: 6

摘要

自20世纪90年代以来,大多数拉美国家大幅扩大了非缴费养老金计划。在解释这一扩张浪潮时,研究集中在左翼政党和社会运动的主角以及选举竞争上,通常忽略了有组织的商业和保守政策专家的作用。本文通过对智利2008年非缴费型养老金改革的详细分析,证明了保守派经济学家在制定非缴费型养老金政策方面发挥了积极作用,该政策以适度、有针对性和“激励兼容”的福利为特征,并由一般预算提供资金。该计划的保守设计促进了雇主和私人养老基金的广泛支持,这对改革的最终通过至关重要。该分析表明,有必要将商业利益纳入对拉丁美洲和更广泛的全球南方国家福利国家改革的解释中,特别是要区分雇主和私人供应商的利益,并关注他们与保守派政策专家的互动。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Business Interests, Conservative Economists, and the Expansion of Noncontributory Pensions in Latin America
Since the 1990s, most Latin American countries have significantly expanded noncontributory pension programs. In explaining this wave of expansion, research has focused on the protagonism of left parties and social movements and on electoral competition, generally disregarding the roles of organized business and conservative policy experts. This article demonstrates, through a detailed analysis of Chile’s 2008 noncontributory pension reform, that conservative economists played active roles in formulating a noncontributory pension policy characterized by moderate, targeted, and “incentive-compatible” benefits and financed by the general budget. The conservative design of the program facilitated broad support from employers and private pension funds, critical for the eventual passage of the reform. The analysis illustrates the need to incorporate business interests into explanations of welfare state reforms in Latin America and the broader Global South, in particular by distinguishing the interests of employers and private providers and by focusing on their interaction with conservative policy experts.
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来源期刊
Politics & Society
Politics & Society Multiple-
CiteScore
5.00
自引率
4.20%
发文量
16
期刊介绍: Politics & Society is a peer-reviewed journal. All submitted papers are read by a rotating editorial board member. If a paper is deemed potentially publishable, it is sent to another board member, who, if agreeing that it is potentially publishable, sends it to a third board member. If and only if all three agree, the paper is sent to the entire editorial board for consideration at board meetings. The editorial board meets three times a year, and the board members who are present (usually between 9 and 14) make decisions through a deliberative process that also considers written reports from absent members. Unlike many journals which rely on 1–3 individual blind referee reports and a single editor with final say, the peers who decide whether to accept submitted work are thus the full editorial board of the journal, comprised of scholars from various disciplines, who discuss papers openly, with author names known, at meetings. Editors are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest when evaluating manuscripts and to recuse themselves from voting if such a potential exists.
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