朝鲜的核军备战略与欺骗

Q1 Arts and Humanities
H. Park
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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文分析了朝鲜的核军备战略。为此,本文将维品•纳朗的理论运用到北韩,从战略层面分析了北韩发展和加强核武器的努力。这项研究认为,朝鲜的欺骗行动对其“战略”核建设的最终成功至关重要。文章发现,朝鲜最初采取了“隐藏战略”,但在核计划被曝光后,通过与美国达成的欺骗性协议,继续进行核计划,最终在2013年成功开发了核武器。随后,北韩采取“冲刺战略”,与美国进行了欺骗性的无核化谈判,以防止美国的军事打击,并为持续的核建设争取必要的时间。中国还通过容忍朝鲜的核军备和外交援助以及各种秘密援助,允许了一种“隐蔽的追求”。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
North Korea’s nuclear armament strategy and deception
ABSTRACT This article analyzes North Korea’s nuclear armament strategy. For this purpose, it applies Vipin Narang’s theory to North Korea and analyzes North Korea’s efforts to develop and strengthen its nuclear weapons on a strategic level. This study argues that North Korea’s deception operations were crucial to the ultimate success of its “strategic” nuclear buildup. This article found that North Korea initially employed a “hiding strategy,” but after its nuclear program was exposed, it managed to continue its nuclear program through deceptive agreements with the United States and eventually succeeded in developing nuclear weapons in 2013. Then, North Korea adopted a “sprinting strategy” and initiated deceptive denuclearization negotiations with the United States to prevent a military strike by the United States and gain the time necessary for its continuous nuclear buildup. China also allowed a “sheltered pursuit” through tolerance of North Korea’s nuclear armament and diplomatic assistance as well as various clandestine assistances.
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来源期刊
Defence Studies
Defence Studies Arts and Humanities-History
CiteScore
2.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
47
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