应对2025 - 2030年解放军的布局战略

IF 1.3
Asia Policy Pub Date : 2022-10-01 DOI:10.1353/asp.2022.0067
Eric W. Sayers
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引用次数: 0

摘要

今天在西太平洋的军事平衡是中华人民共和国25年来成功努力的结果,它建立了一种专门针对美国空军和海军的军事能力,并使其处于危险之中。自上世纪90年代中期台海危机以来,中国一直在努力利用美军的弱点,削弱美国的实力。中国的地理、战略和军事系统使美军及其所捍卫的利益面临重大风险。有理由相信,北京现在可以成功地发动闪电攻击,夺取战略优势或目标。反过来,这将迫使华盛顿要么接受一个未遂的既成事实的结果,要么卷入一场高风险的军事冲突,将中国人民解放军(PLA)部队赶出他们的目标。当美国及其盟友计划在未来几十年里将解放军视为一个挑战时,这个棘手的问题将进一步加剧。在国防规划领域,当时间表被推到未来时,任何事情都是可能的。对于华盛顿来说,关注中国在21世纪30年代及以后将构成的军事挑战是方便的,届时令人兴奋的新兴技术和新的军事硬件有望提供理论上可以缩小两国军队差距的作战能力,但目前还不存在。然而,如果华盛顿只是组织起来应对2035年的中国军事困境,它将陷入一个时间规划陷阱。正如过去一年所表明的那样,北京在美国在西太平洋的重要利益地区升级了其胁迫和侵略的使用。考虑到这一现实,五角大楼、立法者和白宫需要一种能够在近期到中期(2025 - 2030年)有效遏制解放军的战略。严重的成本,潜在的误判,以及削弱军队的影响
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
A Strategy of Distribution for Addressing the PLA of 2025–30
T oday’s military balance in the western Pacific is the product of the successful 25-year effort by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to build a military capability that specifically targets and holds at risk U.S. air and maritime forces. Since the Taiwan Strait crisis in the mid-1990s, China has worked diligently to exploit vulnerabilities in U.S. forces and mitigate U.S. strengths. The PRC’s geography, strategy, and military systems place the U.S. military—and the interests it defends—at significant risk. There is reason to believe that Beijing could now successfully launch a lightning attack that would seize a strategic advantage or objective. This, in turn, would force Washington either to accept the result of an attempted fait accompli or to engage in a high-risk military conflict to dislodge People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces from their target. This wicked problem is further exacerbated by the time horizons that the United States and its allies confront when planning to address the PLA as a challenge over multiple decades. Anything is possible in the arena of defense planning when timelines are pushed well into the future. It is convenient for Washington to focus on the military challenge the PRC will pose in the 2030s and beyond, when exciting emerging technologies and new military hardware promise to offer operational capabilities that can theoretically close the gap between the two militaries but do not yet exist. Yet Washington would be falling into a temporal planning trap if it only organized to address the PRC military dilemma of 2035. As the past year has demonstrated, Beijing has escalated its use of coercion and aggression in areas of significant U.S. interest in the western Pacific. Given this reality, the Pentagon, lawmakers, and the White House need a strategy that can effectively deter the PLA in the near to medium term (2025–30). The grave costs, potential for miscalculation, and impact of the eroding military
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来源期刊
Asia Policy
Asia Policy Arts and Humanities-History
CiteScore
0.80
自引率
0.00%
发文量
55
期刊介绍: Asia Policy is a peer-reviewed scholarly journal presenting policy-relevant academic research on the Asia-Pacific that draws clear and concise conclusions useful to today’s policymakers.
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