零售连锁中的双重代理

IF 0.7
Steven C. Michael
{"title":"零售连锁中的双重代理","authors":"Steven C. Michael","doi":"10.1080/1046669X.2019.1657740","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Retail distribution is often organized into chain stores, where geographically dispersed units operate under a common trademark and operational routines. Franchising is an organizational form chosen by entrepreneurs to manage retail chains. Previous research has maintained that franchising is a solution to “the” agency problem. This article shows how franchising solves one agency problem, shirking, but creates another, free riding, giving rise to dual agency problems. We test which has a stronger effect on performance. Using stochastic frontier estimation, a technique from empirical economics, we show that marketing spending yields less sales for franchised chains relative to owned chains, suggesting that the loss associated with free riding dominates the gain from controlling shirking. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.","PeriodicalId":45360,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Marketing Channels","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2020-04-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1046669X.2019.1657740","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Dual agency in retail chains\",\"authors\":\"Steven C. Michael\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/1046669X.2019.1657740\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract Retail distribution is often organized into chain stores, where geographically dispersed units operate under a common trademark and operational routines. Franchising is an organizational form chosen by entrepreneurs to manage retail chains. Previous research has maintained that franchising is a solution to “the” agency problem. This article shows how franchising solves one agency problem, shirking, but creates another, free riding, giving rise to dual agency problems. We test which has a stronger effect on performance. Using stochastic frontier estimation, a technique from empirical economics, we show that marketing spending yields less sales for franchised chains relative to owned chains, suggesting that the loss associated with free riding dominates the gain from controlling shirking. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.\",\"PeriodicalId\":45360,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Marketing Channels\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-04-02\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1080/1046669X.2019.1657740\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Marketing Channels\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/1046669X.2019.1657740\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Marketing Channels","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1046669X.2019.1657740","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要零售分销通常被组织成连锁店,在那里,地理上分散的单位按照共同的商标和运营惯例运营。特许经营是企业家为管理零售连锁企业而选择的一种组织形式。先前的研究表明,特许经营是解决代理问题的一种方法。这篇文章展示了特许经营如何解决一个代理问题,推卸责任,但却创造了另一个问题,搭便车,从而产生双重代理问题。我们测试哪个对性能有更强的影响。使用随机前沿估计(一种来自实证经济学的技术),我们表明,与自有连锁店相比,特许连锁店的营销支出产生的销售额更少,这表明与搭便车相关的损失主导了控制推卸的收益。讨论了对理论和实践的启示。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Dual agency in retail chains
Abstract Retail distribution is often organized into chain stores, where geographically dispersed units operate under a common trademark and operational routines. Franchising is an organizational form chosen by entrepreneurs to manage retail chains. Previous research has maintained that franchising is a solution to “the” agency problem. This article shows how franchising solves one agency problem, shirking, but creates another, free riding, giving rise to dual agency problems. We test which has a stronger effect on performance. Using stochastic frontier estimation, a technique from empirical economics, we show that marketing spending yields less sales for franchised chains relative to owned chains, suggesting that the loss associated with free riding dominates the gain from controlling shirking. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
期刊介绍: The Journal of Marketing Channels is the first and only professional marketing journal to focus exclusively on distribution systems, strategy, and management. The journal recognizes the growing importance of distribution as a key strategic variable in marketing management. Indeed, if one looks realistically at the major strategy variables of the marketing mix—product, price, promotion, and distribution—the greatest potential for achieving a competitive advantage now lies in distribution. The reason? Rapid technology transfer has made product advantages increasingly difficult to maintain. International operations seeking lower costs have made price advantages much harder to sustain because everybody seems to be “playing the same game.” Even promotion, which relies so heavily on mass media advertising, has become a battle of who can spend the most money. But distribution still offers a new frontier for competing successfully especially if the emphasis is placed on the design and management of superior marketing channel systems to provide excellent customer service. A competitive advantage gained through better distribution is not easily copied by the competition and hence becomes a long-term sustainable competitive advantage. Yet designing optimal marketing channel systems, formulating innovative distribution strategies, and managing marketing channel systems effectively is no simple task. In fact, professional marketing expertise of a very high order is required to meet these challenges, especially given the growing competitive role and rapid pace of web-based marketing. The Journal of Marketing Channels helps provide the knowledge and tools needed to develop superior distribution systems, strategies, and management. Leading authorities from around the world present the most up-to-date and in-depth thought, analysis, and research on these topics in this refereed international quarterly journal.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信