本体论实在论与后期维特根斯坦

IF 0.3 4区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
C. Humphries
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引用次数: 0

摘要

如果维特根斯坦后来的著作对本体论研究有影响,那么它们似乎集中在这样一种思想上,即形而上学的主张,以及更广泛地理解的本体论承诺,与我们日常的语言使用活动及其所涉及的上下文有很大的距离。如果以这种方式看待它们,似乎可以很自然地将它们视为提供思考本体论现实主义的基础,至少当被解释为形而上学动机时,可以在语言-概念和/或伦理理由上被排除在外,因为语言在我们生活中的形象是不相容的。本文反对这样的结论,声称在目前解释维特根斯坦后期思想的每一种流行方法中,如果我们将他本质上解释为一个反教条主义的思想家,那么我们就不能从他的作品中得出这样的含义,而不把他的内部不一致的立场归因于他——一种涉及某种教条主义承诺本身的立场。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Ontological Realism and the Later Wittgenstein
If Wittgenstein’s later writings have implications for ontological investigations, they would appear to center on the thought that metaphysical claims, along with ontological commitments more broadly conceived, are problematically distanced from our everyday activities of language use and the contexts these involve. If they are taken in this way, it can seem natural to view them as furnishing a basis for thinking that ontological realism, at least when construed as metaphysically motivated, can be ruled out on linguistic-conceptual and/or ethical grounds as incompatible with how language figures in our lives. This paper argues against such a conclusion by claiming that on each of the currently prevalent approaches to interpreting Wittgenstein’s later thought, if we construe him as essentially an anti-dogmatic thinker, then we cannot draw such implications from his work without uncharitably attributing to him an internally inconsistent stance—one involving some sort of dogmatic commitment itself.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
0.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
14
期刊介绍: International Philosophical Quarterly has provided a peer-reviewed forum in English for the international exchange of basic philosophical ideas since 1961. The journal stands in the general tradition of theistic and personalist humanism without further restriction of school or philosophical orientation, and is open to both the philosophical discussion of contemporary issues and historical studies. It is truly international in scope with contributions from authors around the world and circulation to institutions and individuals in 70 countries. IPQ numbers among its Associate Editors scholars from both the Far East and Europe, and the journal enjoys a long-standing relationship with the Facultés Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix in Belgium.
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